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PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE ROLE OF 
SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS  




Corporate law has embraced private ordering -- tailoring a firm’s 
corporate governance to meet its individual needs.  Firms, particularly 
venture-capital backed start-ups, are increasingly adopting firm-specific 
governance provisions such as dual-class voting structures, 
arrangements to create stable shared control rights among a coalition of 
minority shareholders, and provisions that limit the permissible fora for 
shareholder litigation.  Courts have broadly upheld these provisions as 
consistent with the contractual theory of the firm.  Commentators too, 
while finding some governance provisions objectionable, nonetheless 
support a private ordering approach as facilitating innovation and 
enhancing efficiency. 
 
Although most analyses of private ordering focus on provisions in a 
corporation’s charter and bylaws, private corporations are increasingly 
turning to an alternative governance mechanism -- shareholder 
agreements.  Shareholder agreements have largely escaped both judicial 
and academic scrutiny, but language in a handful of judicial opinions 
suggests that corporate participants have greater latitude to engage in 
private ordering through a shareholder agreement and even that 
shareholder agreements can be used to avoid otherwise-mandatory 
provisions of corporate law.   
 
 
*  Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  I am grateful for the many helpful comments from Elizabeth Pollman, Gabriel 
Rauterberg, Adriana Robertson, Roy Shapira and participants at the 2019 BYU Winter 
Deals Conference and the PE/VC Subcommittee of the 2019 ABA Business Law Section 
Annual Meeting.  Kevin Hayne, Penn Law Class of 2021, provided exemplary research 
assistance.   
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This Article offers the first broad-based analysis of shareholder 
agreements, detailing the scope of issues to which they are addressed 
and identifying the challenges that they pose for corporate governance.  
Although shareholder agreements are a natural component of the small 
closely-held corporations that essentially operate as incorporated 
partnerships, they rely on principles of contract that are in tension with 
the fundamental structure of corporate law.  This tension is particularly 
problematic for the increasing number of large privately-held 
corporations whose governance structures are shielded from the 
transparency and price discipline of the public capital markets.   
 
The Article challenges the growing use of shareholder agreements and 
maintains instead that corporations should engage in private ordering 
exclusively through their charter and bylaws.  It further critiques efforts 
to use shareholder agreements to evade statutory or common law limits 
on private ordering and argues that, to the extent such limits are 





 Private ordering – tailoring a corporation’s structure and 
governance mechanisms to meet firm-specific needs – is an important 
feature of corporate law.1  New IPO companies like Facebook and Snap 
use dual or multi-class voting structures to protect a founder’s ability to 
pursue his or her idiosyncratic vision while enabling public shareholders 
to share in the economic growth of the firm. 2 VC-funded firms like Trados 
implement negotiated board structures that balance control rights and veto 
power among shareholders with different incentives and skill sets.3 A 
growing number of corporations are adopting provisions to increase board 
 
1 See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2015) (defining private ordering as “the adoption of 
issuer-specific rules that are contractual in nature (as opposed to statutes, agency rules, 
or decisional law)”). 
2 See, e.g., Dave Michaels, Facebook, Snap and Other Firms Targeted by SEC 
Regulator’s Attack on Dual-Class Shares, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2018 (describing 
Facebook and Snap as using multi-class voting structures to preserve founder control). 
3 See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, *3 (2009) (describing 
composition of Trados board of directors which included 4 representatives of venture 
capital firms, two Trados executives and one outside director). 
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accountability to shareholders such as majority voting4 and proxy access.5 
Commentators defend private ordering based on its capacity to produce 
efficient firm-specific rules and to facilitate valuable experimentation and 
innovation in corporate governance.6 
 The standard tools by which corporations engage in private 
ordering are the certificate of incorporation or charter and the bylaws.7  
State corporation statutes allow corporations to tailor their charter and 
bylaws to meet their individual needs, and courts have taken a largely 
contractual approach to evaluating and interpreting these provisions.8  As 
the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained, “Because corporate 
charters and bylaws are contracts, our rules of contract interpretation 
apply.”9  The permissible scope of the charter and bylaws – and thus the 
matters that corporations can address through private ordering – has been 
the subject of extensive judicial attention.  For example, in March 2020, 
the Delaware Supreme Court made national headlines10 when it upheld a 
 
4 See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority 
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1144 (2016) 
(empirically analyzing adoption of majority voting at S&P 1500 companies). 
5 See, e.g., Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire Holland, The Latest on Proxy 
Access, HARV. LAW SCHOOL FOR. ON CORP. GOV., Feb. 1, 2019, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/ (reporting that 
71% of S&P 500 companies had adopted a proxy access bylaw by the end of 2018, up 
from 1% in 2014). 
6 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering 
with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORD. L. REV. 125, 174 (2011) (explaining that private 
ordering “enables each corporation to become a laboratory of corporate governance, 
experimenting with different models of shareholder participation and ultimately 
producing a diversity of governance forms and practices.”). 
7 See, e.g., Megan Shaner, Interpreting Organizational “Contracts” and the Private 
Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 988 (2019) 
(“With increasing frequency and creativity, the certificate of incorporation and bylaws 
of public corporations are being used as tools for restructuring key aspects of corporate 
governance.”).  
8 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate 
Bylaws, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 373, 377 (2018) (“the governing documents of the 
corporation—the charter and bylaws—operate and bind both managers and 
shareholders as if they had negotiated their terms and signed them, like a common law 
contract”). 
9 Blackrock Credit Allocation Income Trust v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 224 
A.3d 964, 977 (Del. 2020). 
10 Alison Frankel, Dela. Supreme Court: Companies can pick forum for shareholders’ 
Section 11 claims, REUTERS, March 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-
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charter provision providing actions arising under section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 to be filed in federal court.11   
 Although most analyses of private ordering focus on charter and 
bylaw provisions, corporations are increasingly turning to an alternative 
governance mechanism -- shareholder agreements.  Shareholder 
agreements have a long history in small closely-held corporations which 
typically operate as quasi-partnerships,12 but their use has migrated into 
larger corporations such as venture-capital funded start-ups and even to 
public companies.13  Despite their increased importance, shareholder 
agreements have received little attention.     
 The permissible scope and enforceability of shareholder 
agreements are uncharted territory Those commentators that have 
addressed the topic often claim that corporate participants can use 
shareholder agreements to evade otherwise-mandatory provisions of 
corporate law, a conclusion that is supported by language in some judicial 




11 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). 
12 See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 
18 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 435 (1953). Close corporations are typically defined 
“by a blending of the roles of shareholder, officer, and director; the close personal 
relationships between the players; and the lack of market for reselling shares.” Martin 
Edwards, The Big Crowd and the Small Enterprise: Intracorporate Disputes in the 
Close-But-Crowdfunded Firm, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 411, 414 (2018). 
13 See Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and Control: The Role of Contract 
in Corporate Governance, working paper dated June 2020, at 5 (showing that “about 
15% of companies that go public over the last  five years do so subject to a shareholder 
agreement.”).  See also Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 93 (describing stockholders agreement between Liberty Media and Charter); 
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 926 (Del. 2003) (describing 
voting agreement entered into by NCS officers in connection with Genesis Merger 
Agreement in their capacity as shareholders). 
14 See, e.g., Daniel T. Janis, Venture Capital Shareholder Agreements—More Attention 
Now, Less Heartache Later, BUS. L. TODAY, May 18, 2017, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/05/03_janis/  
(“Shareholder agreements give VCs extensive rights, far beyond the economics 
reflected in a company’s charter); Rauterberg, supra note 13 at 13 (explaining that 
“[t]he essential function of shareholder agreements lies in the fact that they are not [] 
constrained” by the mandatory components of corporation statutes).  
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holdings are narrow and context-specific.15  Critically, however, courts 
approach shareholder agreements differently, analyzing their validity 
according to principles of contract law rather than corporate law.  
Consistent with this approach, they treat shareholder agreements as 
personal waivers of a shareholder’s individual rights,16 governed by the 
general principle that private parties can validly waive common law, 
statutory and even constitutional rights by contract.17   
 The recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions in Manti Holdings 
LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co. demonstrate the potentially expansive 
private ordering available through shareholder agreements.18  In Manti, 
the court upheld a shareholder agreement waiving the common 
shareholders’ statutory appraisal rights.19  The court concluded that, 
because the parties were sophisticated, represented by counsel and 
received consideration, the shareholder agreement was a valid contract.20  
Although the petitioners argued that the Delaware appraisal statute, was a 
mandatory component of Delaware law that could not be subject to 
waiver, the court rejected this argument, concluding that nothing in the 
statute precluded petitioners from waiving their appraisal rights.   
Critically the court treated the shareholder agreement as personal rather 
than corporate, reasoning that it “did not restrict the appraisal rights of the 
 
15 See, e.g., Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, *58 
n.49 (stating that “stockholders can bind themselves contractually in a stockholders 
agreement in a manner that cannot be permissibly accomplished through a certificate of 
incorporation.”).  Similarly, although Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354 (Del. 2014) 
is often cited as support for the broad scope afforded to shareholder agreements, the 
court in that case explicitly concluded that the shareholder agreement in question did 
not “violate section 212(a) of the DGCL.”  Id. at 384. 
16 See, e.g., Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 247, *79 (“By 
entering into the Stockholders' Agreement, Klaassen agreed voluntarily not to exercise 
his power as holder of a majority of the corporation's outstanding voting power to 
remove the Remaining Directors without cause.”). 
17 See, e.g., Windmill Inns of Am., Inc. v. Cauvin, 299 Ore. App. 567, 576 (2019) 
quoting Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. State of Oregon, 353 Ore. 170, 183 
(2013) (“The general rule in Oregon is that, although waivers of constitutional and 
statutory rights may be expressed through contract terms, those terms must clearly 
indicate an intention to renounce a known privilege or power.”).  
18 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 307; 
Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 318 (Del. 
Ch., Sept. 28, 2018) 




classes of stock held by the Petitioners;”21 rather the petitioners had simply 
agreed by contract “to forbear from exercising that right.”22    
 Manti appears to sanction the growing trend of using shareholder 
agreements to engage in aggressive private ordering, a trend that is 
particularly significant in large private companies such as venture-capital 
funded start-ups, private equity owned firms, and “scaled” private 
companies.23  The economic importance of shareholder agreements has 
grown as the number, size and age of private companies has increased.24  
In some cases, shareholder agreements continue in effect even after a 
company enters the public market.25  Public companies that have 
substantial or controlling shareholders may also use shareholder 
agreements to allocate that control.26    
This trend provides several reasons for concern.  Simply put, 
shareholder agreements raise investor protection issues, including a lack 
of transparency, judicial oversight, and standardization.  They allow 
unequal treatment of similarly-situated shareholders.  And they sacrifice 
both the substantive and procedural predictability of the corporate form.  
Moreover, because the option of private ordering through shareholder 
agreements is far greater for private corporations than for public ones, 
they create an anomalous dichotomy in the scope of corporate law in an 
era in which the line between public and private corporations has 
 
21 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 319, *11 
22 Id. 
23 Christopher B. Chuff, Contracting Out of Appraisal Rights, HARV. L. SCHOOL FOR. 
ON CORP. GOV., Oct. 23, 2018, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/23/contracting-out-of-appraisal-rights/ 
(explaining that the Manti decision “brings further certainty to private equity and 
venture capital investors whose investments include drag-along rights with appraisal 
waivers”). 
24 See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the 
Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2017) (explaining the 
regulatory factors that have led to a decline in the number of public companies as 
corporations remain private longer and raise substantial funding through the private 
capital markets). 
25 Rauterberg, supra note 13.. 
26 See Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 93 (describing 
stockholders agreement between Liberty Media and Charter); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 926 (Del. 2003) (describing voting agreement entered 




become increasingly blurred.27  At the same time, they increase what is 
already a growing concern – the potential for highly-problematic 
governance practices in private companies.  Notably, these are precisely 
those companies that are not subject to the disclosure requirements and 
discipline imposed by the public capital markets.28   
Accordingly, this Article argues that shareholder agreements are 
inappropriate tools for private ordering and that firm-specific tailoring of 
governance rights in both public and private corporations should be 
restricted to the charter and bylaws.  To be clear, this article is not 
challenging the role of shareholder agreements in the traditional close 
corporation – ventures that operate largely as incorporated partnerships – 
and the flexibility that they provide to participants in those firms.29  
Delaware and other states offer close corporation statutes with distinctive 
features, including greater contractual freedom, for corporations that 
both qualify and choose to be governed by their terms.30  Rather, the 
Article is addressed to the substantial number of private companies that 
 
27 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 384 (2013) (explaining 
that the “boundary issues along the public--private divide are under theorized and, up 
until recently, left to resolution by reference to regulatory legacies from a time far 
different from today's trading markets.”).  See also Edwards, supra note 12, at 416 
(describing equity crowdfunding as applying “a new tension to the already uneasy 
division between public and close corporations.”). 
28 See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 165, 167-168 (2017) (observing that “in the absence of an impending IPO, 
Unicorn managers and investors lack sufficient incentives to develop governance 
structures and practices appropriate for enterprises of their scale.”). 
29 See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of 
Corporation Law, 5 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 263, 274 (2008) (observing that “The close 
corporation's distinguishing features sharply differentiate it from the public 
corporation”). 
30 See, e.g., Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-in: Limited Liability Companies 
and the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1362 
(1995) (estimating that only 5% of eligible firms elect statutory close corporation 
status); Notably, despite the availability of these statutes, they are not widely used.  See 
id. at 1363 (examining “the possible reasons for the systematic underutilization of close 
corporation statutes by firms eligible for that status”). States also offer alternative 
business structures such as limited liability companies and limited partnership, in which 
freedom of contract takes precedence over the applicable statutory provisions.  See, 
e.g., Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 2129 (2018) (describing and identifying potential concerns with the 
extensive contractual freedom provided to investors in LLCs). 
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do not share these characteristics, including venture capital-financed 
startups, companies owned by private equity funds, as well as established 
private companies with meaningful numbers of passive investors31 – 
companies that, in a different legal and economic environment could 
have entered the public markets.32  The number of large corporations that 
do not go public continues to increase, and their economic importance 
has increased as well.33  These corporations exist along a broad spectrum 
of size and ownership structure and cannot be divided in a binary way 
between corporations in which mandatory rules are desirable as a policy 
matter and those in which they are not.   For these corporations, this 
Article argues that a uniform approach to corporate law is both practical 
and normatively desirable.   
The Article’s premise is that corporate law provides a set of 
substantive and procedural rules that both define the corporation and 
govern the rights and powers of its constituencies.  The use of the 
corporate form signals the application of these rules both to corporate 
participants such as officers, directors, and shareholders and to third 
parties that deal with the corporation.  These rules provide predictability 
with respect to the corporation’s operations, enhance the accuracy of 
investment pricing and facilitate the use of contracts.   
Within these rules, a corporation’s charter and bylaws are key.  
Together they form the corporation’s governing documents; they set out 
the rights and responsibilities of officers, directors, and shareholders.  
Corporate law incorporates the concept of implicit consent; the terms of 
the governing documents are binding on all corporate participants, 
regardless of their individual sophistication, knowledge, and consent.  
Corporate law provides the procedures by which these documents may 
be altered and the features they can and cannot contain.  Moving from 
the implicit contract of corporate law to the explicit contract of common 
 
31 See, e.g., Carol Goforth, Too Many Cooks Spoil the Cake, and too many Statutes 
Spoil the LLC: A Plea for Uniformity, 46 Sw. L. Rev. 63, 69-70 2016) (defining closely 
held corporations and observing that “[c]ompanies that   have not yet "gone public" in 
the sense of registering any of their equity interests with the Securities Exchange 
Commission may still be owned by such a widely diverse group of investors that they 
are not ‘closely held’ under this definition”). 
32 See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 24 (explaining the regulatory factors that have led 
to a decline in the number of public companies as corporations remain private longer 
and raise substantial funding through the private capital markets). 
33 Jones, supra note 28 at 177. 
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law sacrifices the uniformity, universality and certainty that are 
fundamental values of the corporate form.   
As a result, the article argues that corporations should engage in 
private ordering exclusively through their charter and bylaws, and the 
scope of shareholder agreements should be limited to matters that are 
truly individual in nature.34  The distinction between private ordering and 
individual issues is informed by the types of issues that charter and 
bylaw provisions in public companies typically address, including 
director and officer fiduciary duties, inspection rights, appraisal rights, 
forum selection provisions and the procedures governing shareholder 
voting.  Critically, shareholder agreements should not be used to 
restructure the scope of officer, director and controlling shareholder 
accountability.  In addition, the article argues that shareholder 
agreements should be subject to the traditional hierarchy of governance 
tools, meaning that a shareholder agreement that is inconsistent with the 
statute, charter or bylaws, should not be enforceable.35   
This analysis is in tension with the Manti decision which held 
that an appraisal waiver in a shareholder agreement could be valid even 
if the Delaware appraisal statute is understood to be a mandatory 
provision.36  I do not argue that appraisal waivers are normatively 
undesirable; indeed, I make the case elsewhere that appraisal waivers 
such as the one in Manti are likely an efficient market-driven solution to 
 
34 This Article focuses specifically on the use of shareholder agreements to address 
issues of corporate governance such as inspection rights, preemptive rights director 
appointment and removal rights, appraisal rights, restrictions on transferability and 
supermajority voting requirements.   It is not addressed to contractual provisions that 
deal with the manner of payment, issues such as registration rights, or voting 
agreements that fall within the express contours of state corporation statutes.  Gabriel 
Rauterberg offers a somewhat different taxonomy – differentiating between horizontal 
agreements as those among shareholders to which the corporation is not a party, and 
vertical agreements which involve commitments between the corporation itself and one 
or more shareholders.  See Rauterberg, supra note 13, at 20. 
35 According to commentators, courts do not currently impose such a limitation.  See, 
e.g., See Rauterberg, supra note 13 (arguing that “Delaware applies a fundamentally 
different paradigm of understanding to shareholder agreements than to the charter and 
bylaws, and this results in granting the former a wider span of freedom.”); Wells, supra 
note 29 (arguing that “courts will permit [shareholder agreements] to establish 
governance structures that would not be countenanced in the charter or bylaws.”). 




deficiencies in appraisal litigation.37  Instead, this article argues that, to 
the extent that private ordering innovations conflict with mandatory 
features of corporate law, the appropriate solution is legislation explicitly 
expanding the permissible scope of private ordering.  Delaware has 
consistently taken this approach, amending the statute to authorize 
private ordering in respond to evolving business needs through 
legislation authorizing, for example, proxy access bylaws, waivers of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine, and forum selection bylaws.38   Notably, 
the legislature is particularly well suited to weigh the public policy 
considerations associated with retaining or eliminating a mandatory 
feature of the law.  As with the appraisal waiver at issue in Manti, 
attempts by corporations to modify an existing mandatory feature of the 
law through innovative private ordering provisions – whether in the 
charter, bylaws or a shareholder agreement -- may be evidence that 
legislative reconsideration of that feature is appropriate. 
The article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly summarizes the 
contractual approach to corporate law and the statutory and judicially-
imposed limits on that freedom of contract through mandatory rules.  
Part II describes the increasing use of shareholder agreements and their 
limited consideration by the courts.  Part III identifies the problems with 
using shareholder agreements to achieve private ordering in 
corporations.  Part IV considers the implications of this analysis.   It 
concludes that the identified problems are best addressed by requiring 
private ordering to take place through the charter and bylaws rather than 
through shareholder agreements.  It further argues that states should 
respond to contractual innovation through legislation delineating the 
permissible scope of such provisions.   
 
I. Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law 
 
A.  The Contractual Approach 
 
 Courts and commentators have widely embraced the contractual 
approach to corporate law both as a descriptive matter and a normative 
one.39  This approach builds on an academic theory first advanced in the 
 
37 See Jill E. Fisch, Appraisal Waivers, working paper dated July 6, 2020. 
38 See infra notes __ through __ and accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 8, at 374 (identifying the origins of contractual approach 
to corporate law).  
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economics literature40 but that gained prominence in the legal literature 
thirty years ago with the publication of a symposium in the Columbia 
law review. 41  The economic theory is part of the literature on the theory 
of the firm, and argues that a corporation is best understood, not as an 
entity but as a nexus of contracts.42  Accordingly, the contractual model 
views the officers, directors and shareholders of a corporation, as well as 
other corporate stakeholders, as using contract-like mechanisms to 
allocate their respective rights and responsibilities.43   
 Some supporters of the contractual approach argue that it has 
normative implications, specifically that corporate law should not adopt 
a one-size-fits all approach but should enable corporate participants to 
tailor the rules and structure of their enterprise to meet their needs.44  
Corporate law, these scholars claim, should facilitate the contracting 
process by accepting a wide-range of firm-specific terms and provisions.  
Although the law can furnish a default set of terms, it should be 
“enabling” in the sense that it allows individual firms to modify the 
 
40 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: 
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 48, 56 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. 
Winter eds., 1993) ("The firm is essentially a choice of contractual arrangements."); 
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (developing 
the nexus of contracts approach to the theory of the firm).  The conception of the 
corporation as a contract can be traced back to Trs. of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).  See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Regulating Corporate Takeovers: State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract 
Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 621 (1988) (describing “the Dartmouth College view of 
the corporation as a contract with the state”).  
41 See generally Symposium: Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1395 et seq. (1989). 
42 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 40 at 310 (“Contractual relations are the essence of 
the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc. The 
problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts… .”). 
43 See, e.g., Charles R. T. O'Kelley, Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-Of-Contracts Theory 
of the Firm: A Reflection on Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur 
Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1266-67 (2012)  (explaining that the firm’s 
nexus of contracts encompasses relationships among the firm’s proprietor, investors, 
suppliers, lenders and employees). 
44 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1549, 1551 (1989) (distinguishing between the positive implications of the nexus 
of contract theory and “normative contractarianism”). 
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terms to meet their individual needs.45  This firm-specific tailoring of 
corporate law rules is commonly termed private ordering.   
 Private ordering is defended on a variety of efficiency grounds.46  
It allows efficient customization in corporate structures by enabling rules 
to vary with firm-specific differences.  It also allows innovation and 
experimentation and reduces the risk of regulatory error associated with 
mandatory regulation.47  A firm’s governance choices are also 
constrained by market discipline.   
 Corporate law generally facilitates private ordering. Most 
statutory provisions are structured as default rules that explicitly 
authorize individual corporations to modify the statutory default through 
a charter provision, a bylaw or, in some cases, a board resolution.  For 
example, the Delaware statute provides that, as a default rule, 
corporations shall elect the board of directors on an annual basis.48  The 
statute explicitly authorizes corporations to depart from this default and 
to adopt a staggered board.49  The statute further instructs corporations 
that, if they choose to modify the statutory default and engage in private 
ordering, they must do so “by the certificate of incorporation or by an 
initial bylaw, or by a bylaw adopted by a vote of the stockholders.”50 
 As this section illustrates, in many cases, the statutory text 
explicitly contemplates private ordering.  The scope of private ordering 
is not, however, limited to topics in which there is specific statutory 
authorization.  The governing documents of the corporation – the charter 
and bylaws – allow corporations to adopt a variety of firm-specific 
governance terms.  The scope of issues that may be addressed through a 
firm-specific charter or bylaw provision is very broad.  For example, the 
Delaware statute allows a corporate charter to contain “any provision for 
the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the 
corporation,” and “any provision creating, defining, limiting and 
regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the 
stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, . . . if such provisions are 
 
45 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1989) (“The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is to 
adopt a background term that prevails unless varied by contract.”). 
46 See Fisch, supra note 1 at 1639 (describing the advantages of private ordering). 
47 See id. (citing bylaws responding to board adoption and use of poison pills as an 
example of innovation through private ordering). 
48 8 Del. §141(d). 
49 Id. 
50 8 Del. §141(d). 
13 
 
not contrary to the laws of this State.”51  It further provides that the 
bylaws may address any subject, "not inconsistent with law or with the 
certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, 
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers 
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”52 
 The courts have upheld the power of corporations to address a 
variety of novel issues through bylaw and charter provisions. For 
example, in Boilermakers, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the 
validity of forum-selection bylaws.53  In ATP, the Court found fee-
shifting bylaws to be facially valid.54  And most recently, in Salzberg, 
the Court upheld the validity of a charter provision requiring the 
litigation of claims based on section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 to 
be litigated in federal court.55 
 The rationale for these decisions is the contractual theory of the 
corporation. 56  As then-Chancellor Strine explained in Boilermakers, 
“the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding 
broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders formed 
within the statutory framework of the DGCL.”57 Strine’s reasoning in 
Boilermakers explains the rationale behind the contractual approach.  As 
Strine explained, shareholder implicitly consent to the terms of the 
charter and bylaws when they make the voluntary decision to invest in a 
corporation.58  Moreover, shareholders have the power to modify 
 
51 8 Del. § 102(b)(1).  See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 115 (Del. 2020) 
(describing § 102(b)(1)’s scope as “broadly enabling”). 
52 8 Del. § 109(b) 
53 Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. 
Ch. 2013). 
54 ATP Tour Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).  Subsequently, 
the legislature amended the statute to prohibit fee-shifting charter and bylaw provisions. 
55 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102. 
56 See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010), 
citing Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) 
(describing bylaws as “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”). 
57 Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 
2013).  The Delaware legislature validated the former when, in 2015, it adopted 
legislation expressly authorizing issuers to adopt forum selection provisions in their 
charters and bylaws. 8 Del. § 115 (2015). 
58 See, e.g., Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939 (“the bylaws of a Delaware corporation 
constitute part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and 
stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the DGCL”). Strine further 
observed that shareholders also consent to the possibility that the board will unilaterally 
14 
 
contract terms with which they disagree, either by amending the bylaws 
or removing and replacing the directors.59  In addition to providing a 
justification for upholding charter and bylaw provisions that adopt firm-
specific governance terms, the contractual approach also offers a 
methodology for interpreting those provisions bylaws – they are to be 
interpreted using contract principles.60 
 The contract analogy in corporate law is imperfect, however.61  
Certain elements of corporate law are generally understood to be beyond 
the scope of permissible private ordering.62  Commentators term these 
elements “mandatory corporate law.”63 Although at least in the United 
States, most of corporate law is flexible and enabling, the law imposes 
limits on freedom of contract.64  As Chancellor Allen explained 
“[corporate law] is not, however, bereft of mandatory terms . . . . 
Generally, these mandatory provisions may not be varied by the terms of 
the certificate of incorporation or otherwise.”65 
 
amend the bylaws when they invest in a corporation in which the board has been given 
the authority to do so. Id. at 958. 
59 Id. at 956-57. 
60 See BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Trust v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 
224 A.3d 964, 977 (Del. Jan. 13, 2020) (“Because corporate charters and bylaws are 
contracts, our rules of contract interpretation apply”). 
61 See also Fisch, supra note 8 at 377 (challenging the contract metaphor because 
shareholders’ power to adopt and amend bylaws is more limited than that of the board); 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Proposed Intervenors California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System and Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement 
Association, dated May 31, 2019, The Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust v. Johnson & 
Johnson, Civil Action No. 19-08828 (MAS)(LHG), at 22 (D.N.J.) (explaining that 
corporate law does not involve the “mutual manifestation of assent” that is a required 
component of contract law).  
62 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: 
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
supra note 44. 
63 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 
84 NW. U.L. REV. 542, 543 (1990) (using term “mandatory corporate law” to refer to 
corporate law rules that are not “waivable by contract among the relevant parties”). 
64 Jurisdictions outside the United States rely more heavily on mandatory corporate law.  
See, e.g., Jens Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American 
Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2014) (distinguishing US 
law, which is primarily enabling, from European law, which involves more mandatory 
terms); see also Katharina Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. 
ECON. 676 (2003) (comparing the corporate law of ten jurisdictions and describing 
Delaware as an “outlier . . . on the flexible end of the spectrum”).   
65 In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (1997) (emphasis added). 
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 The scope of private ordering may be limited in two ways.  One 
way is through express limitations in the statutory text.  For example, 8 
Del. § 102(f) prohibits fee shifting charter provisions in connection with 
internal corporate claims, and 8 Del. §109(b) does the same for bylaws.66  
Similarly, 8 Del. § 102(b)(7) authorizes contractual limitations on the 
scope of director fiduciary duties but does not permit a waiver of the 
duty of loyalty or the obligation to adhere to the statutory limits on the 
payment of dividends.67   
 The second limit is implicit.  Corporation statutes prohibit charter 
and bylaw provisions  that are “contrary to the laws of this state.”68  As 
then-Vice Chancellor Strine explained in Jones Apparel, “contrary to the 
laws of this State” means charter provisions that ‘transgress a statutory 
enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in the 
General Corporation [Law] itself.’”69  Courts have generally interpreted 
this language to mean that some provisions in the corporation code are 
mandatory and cannot be modified through private ordering.70   
 As Chancellor Allen explained in Ford Holdings: 
 
Under Delaware law, for example, a corporation is 
required to have an annual meeting for the election of 
directors; is required to have shareholder approval for 
amendments to the certificate of incorporation; must have 
appropriate shareholder concurrence in the authorization 
of a merger; and is required to have shareholder approval 
in order to dissolve. Generally, these mandatory 
 
66 See 8 Del. § 102(f) (“The certificate of incorporation may not contain any provision 
that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys' fees or expenses of the 
corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined 
in §115 of this title”); 8 Del. § 109(b) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision that 
would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys' fees or expenses of the 
corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined 
in §115 of this title”). 
67 See Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, *25 (denying 
motion to dismiss a claim alleging that such a charter provision was invalid). 
68 8 Del. § 102(b)(1). 
69 Jones Apparel Group v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 843 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
70 See id. at 846 (explaining that the court will “invalidate a certificate provision [that 
vitiates or contravenes] a mandatory rule of our corporate code”). 
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provisions may not be varied by terms of the certificate of 
incorporation or otherwise.71 
 
 The legal basis by which courts determine which aspects of 
corporate law are mandatory is not entirely clear.  Courts have been 
guided in part by the statutory text.  If a statute section contains the word 
“shall”, for example, some courts have read that language as mandatory.  
Thus the court in H-M Wexford explained that the requirements of 
section 228(c) concerning the validity of written consents were 
mandatory because “The word "shall" is a mandatory term.”72  Similarly, 
the court in Speiser v. Baker emphasized the language of § 211 which 
states that a corporation “shall” hold an annual meeting.73   
 Courts have also looked to the policy behind the statute, 
reasoning that the statute sets up certain core components of the rights 
and responsibilities of directors and shareholders that are not subject to 
firm-specific modification.  One of the areas in which courts have 
applied this policy to limit private ordering is with respect to 
shareholders’ rights to remove directors.  Accordingly, the Rohe court 
concluded that a corporate charter could not restrict the right of 
shareholders to remove directors of a non-classified board without cause 
based in part on the fact that the removal right was a “fundamental 
element of shareholder authority” that could not be eliminated by the 
charter.”74   The court in Frechter v. Zier, applied a similar rationale to 
invalidate a bylaw providing that shareholder could only remove 
directors by a 2/3 vote. 75  Notably, the court in Frechter explicitly 
rejected the argument that, in order to qualify as a mandatory provision, 
a statute section must contain the words shall or must.76  It seems likely 
 
71 Matter of Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. 
Ch. 1997). 
72 H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 152 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
73 Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987).   
74 Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108.  See also In re 
VAALCO Energy, Inc. Stockholder Litigation C.A. No. 11775-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 
21, 2015) (reaching the same conclusion). 
75 Frechter v. Zier, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, *5-6 (“Under the plain language of the 
statute, I find that the Removal provision is inconsistent with Section 141(k).”). 
76 See id. at *7.  But see Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, 
*21 (rejecting challenge to charter provision providing the board with the exclusive 
authority to fill vacancies on the board and newly-created directorships, based on the 
permissive character of § 223). 
17 
 
that courts would take a similar view with respect to a charter or bylaw 
that attempted to divest shareholders of their power to amend the bylaws, 
although the provisions that require such a supermajority vote to do so 
appear to be valid.77   
 A similar rationale applies in other areas.  The court in Kurz 
concluded that directors could not adopt a bylaw that would have the 
effect of enabling them to remove a fellow director.78  Although the text 
of the Delaware statute does not explicitly define or impose fiduciary 
duties on corporate officers and directors, commentators have widely 
reasoned that public policy reasons bar charter or bylaw provisions that 
limit or eliminate the duty of loyalty.79 Thus, the court in Siegman v. Tri-
Star Pictures held that the Delaware statute barred a charter provision 
purporting to limit director liability under the corporate opportunity 
doctrine.80 In Jones Apparel, the court recognized that, although 
Delaware law affords shareholders and managers broad power to engage 
in private ordering through charter provisions but nonetheless questioned 
 
77 Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
78 Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 157 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“For 89 years, Delaware law 
has barred directors from removing other directors.”), 
79 The extent to which corporate law permits the waiver of fiduciary duties has been 
debated extensively.  See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the 
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1077 n.8 (2017) (citing commentators arguing that duty of 
loyalty is a mandatory component of corporate law).  This conclusion has support in the 
statutory text.  See section 102(b)(7). Accord Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 108 Cal. App. 4th 
47, 57 (2003) (holding that “waiver of corporate directors' and majority shareholders' 
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders in private close corporations is against public 
policy”).  Amir Licht has argued that transaction costs and information asymmetries 
counsel provide a justification for precluding fiduciary duties from being fully 
contractable and suggests that permitting fiduciary duty waivers would “lead to 
suboptimal ‘market for lemons’ equilibrium at the societal level.”  Amir N. Licht, 
Motivation, Information, Negotiation: Why Fiduciary Accountability Cannot be 
Negotiable, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 159, 179 (2018).  But see 
Rauterberg & Talley, supra at 1077 (arguing that the perception that the duty of loyalty 
is mandatory is no longer true in light of the adoption by Delaware and other states of 
statutory provisions permitting corporations to waive the corporate opportunity 
doctrine).  
80 Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. No. 9477, 1989 WL 48746, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. May 
30, 1989).  The Delaware legislature subsequently overturned Siegman by statute.  See 
8 Del. § 122(17) (2017). 
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whether a charter provision that divested the board of its statutory power 
to approve a merger or amend the charter would be valid.81   
 Although commentators have debated the normative question of 
whether corporate law should provide unlimited freedom of contract, one 
potential answer to the debate is the existence of alternative business 
forms that allow greater contractual freedom.82  Delaware, for example, 
provides alternative entity structures, the limited partnership and limited 
liability company, that are fully contractual.  Both statutes explicitly state 
that they are intended to give the maximum possible effect to principles 
of freedom of contract.83  Similarly, Delaware and other states allow 
statutory close corporations in which the participants are explicitly 
granted greater contractual freedom than in the traditional corporation.84  
Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that business participants that 
desire greater contractual freedom than is available under corporate law 
can choose a different business form.  Indeed, a number have chosen to 
do so, and courts have upheld provisions in LLCs and LPs that, for 
example, broadly eliminate managers’ fiduciary duties.85 
 
II. Private Ordering Through Shareholder Agreements 
 
The mandatory features in corporate law limit the scope of 
private ordering that corporate participants can obtain through charter 
and bylaw provisions.  As noted in Part I, the charter and bylaws must be 
consistent with the statute and, although the statute does not impose 
many limits on private ordering, courts continue to invalidate provisions 
 
81 Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 849 n.30 (Del. Ch. 
2004) 
82 But see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited 
Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Mark Lowenstein & Robert 
Hillman eds., 2014) (questioning the value of unlimited contractual freedom for non-
corporate business forms). 
83 See, e.g. DLLCA §18-1101 (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum 
effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited 
liability agreements It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability 
agreements”). 
84 See Wells, supra note 29, at 286, 295 (explaining why corporate law’s “statutory 
norms” were a poor fit for close corporations and response of a body of common and 
statutory law specific to the close corporation). 
85 See Molk, supra note 30. 
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that transgress tfhose limits.  This Part considers an alternative tool for 
implementing private ordering – the shareholder agreement.  As subpart 
IIA explains, the use of shareholder agreements in private corporations is 
pervasive.  Despite limited judicial guidance on the permissible scope of 
shareholder agreements, parties appear to be using them in ways that go 
beyond the limits that courts have imposed on the charter and bylaws.86  
As a result, shareholder agreements appear to offer a vehicle for evading 
mandatory corporate law.   
 
A. The Rise of Shareholder Agreements 
 
Shareholder agreements have their origin in close corporations, 
small family businesses that are run, in many cases, as incorporated 
partnerships.87  In close corporations, shareholder agreements are used to 
provide predictability and stability,88 and their use dates back many 
years.89  Participants in close corporations frequently use shareholder 
agreements to designate specific individuals to serve as directors or 
officers, to limit the authority of directors, and to increase shareholder 
control over operational decisions.90  These uses which operated in 
tension with the statutory authority of the board of directors, often led 
early courts to view them with skepticism.91  As a result, a number of 
state legislatures enacted close corporation statutes that explicitly 
authorized greater contractual freedom among the participants in 
corporations that elected to be governed their terms.92   
 
86 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
87 See supra note 12  (describing close corporations).   
88 See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27-28 (1964) (explaining that in a close 
corporation, “often the only sound basis for protection is afforded by a lengthy, detailed 
shareholder agreement securing the rights and obligations of all concerned”). 
89 See, e.g. Faulds v. Yates, 420 Ill. 416, 420 (Ill. 1870). (upholding shareholder 
agreement to choose the company’s officers and directors). 
90 Wells, supra note 29 at 298.  
91 See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313 (N.Y. 1918) (invalidating shareholder 
agreement that violated statutory requirement that corporation be managed by the board 
of directors); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934) (invalidating 
shareholder agreement that selected corporate officers and determined their salaries as 
stripping the board of its power to do so),.      
92 See, e.g., 8 Del §350 (“A written agreement among the stockholders of a close 
corporation holding a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, whether solely 
among themselves or with a party not a stockholder, is not invalid, as between the 
parties to the agreement, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the business 
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Today, however, the use of shareholder agreements is not limited 
to small businesses.  Shareholder agreements are a critical feature of 
corporate governance in private corporations -- corporations that vary 
substantially in size, age, and ownership.93  Private corporations include 
venture capital-financed start-ups, private equity-funded firms including 
corporations that previously traded in the public markets, and established 
private companies with substantial shareholder bases and varying 
degrees of investor liquidity.94  The most visible of these are the Silicon 
Valley unicorns.95  Shareholder agreements are also used, in some cases, 
in public companies.96   
Shareholder agreements address a variety of issues and take a 
variety of forms.97 They may specify the process by which directors will 
be elected or designate specific individuals to serve as directors, provide 
shareholders with preemptive rights or registration rights, designate the 
scope of shareholders’ inspection rights and identify those shareholders 
who can exercise such rights.98 They typically include detailed 
 
and affairs of the corporation as to restrict or interfere with the discretion or powers of 
the board of directors.”). 
93 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155 (2019) 
(explaining that venture capital-funded “startups are different from both public 
corporations and traditional closely held corporations”). 
94 See Goforth, supra note 31 (describing these as companies that have not yet gone 
public).  A variety of secondary markets have developed to enable trading in the stock 
of private companies.  See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 
65 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing legal issues presented by VC secondary 
markets).  
95 Unicorns are private companies with a valuation of $1 billion or more. Jennifer S. 
Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
583, 584 (2016). 
96 See Rauterberg, supra note 13 (detailing frequency of shareholder agreements that 
continue in effect after a company’s IPO); Helena Masullo, Shareholder Agreements in 
Publicly Traded Companies: A Comparison between the U.S. and Brazil, 12 BRAZILIAN 
J. INT’L L. 402, 404 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2770776 (presenting study that 
challenges “the conventional wisdom that shareholder agreements are not used in U.S. 
public corporations”).   
97 Common shareholder agreements in the start-up context include voting agreements, 
stock purchase agreements and investor rights agreements.  See National Venture 
Capital Association, Model Legal Documents, https://nvca.org/model-legal-
documents/.  This article will refer to these documents collectively as shareholder 
agreements. 
98 See generally Corp. Law Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The 
Enforceability and Effectiveness of Typical Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 
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provisions that apply in the context of a merger such as drag-along rights 
and appraisal waivers.99  In some cases, they include limitations on or 
waivers of the right to bring litigation, including litigation alleging 
breaches of fiduciary duties.100   
Private corporations are not required to file shareholder 
agreements with state or federal regulators.101  As a result, it is not 
possible to ascertain the full range of shareholder agreements in 
existence or their terms.102  Some guidance on their use is available, 
however.  The National Venture Capital Association posts a variety of 
model forms of shareholder agreements.103  The Corporation Law 
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
published a report in 2010 summarizing typical provisions in shareholder 
agreements and providing guidance as to their likely enforceability.104  
Many provisions are commonplace in such agreements despite a paucity 
of case law on their enforceability.105  Gabriel Rauterberg has collected 
data from shareholder agreements filed in connection with the IPO 
process and estimates and reports, based on this data, that roughly 55% 
of pre-IPO companies were governed by a shareholder agreement.106  
Rauterberg also finds a significant number of shareholder agreements 
that continue in effect even after a company goes public.107  
 
BUS. LAW. 1153 (2010) (describing common types of issues addressed by shareholder 
agreements and evaluating their enforceability).   
99 Id. 
100 Shareholder agreements may specify a forum for litigation of shareholder disputes or 
select arbitration in lieu of litigation.  See, e.g., id. at 1201-02 (discussing 
considerations in drafting arbitration provisions); Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. 
Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. May 19, 2017) (upholding forum selection provision in 
shareholder agreement).  They may also purport to waive shareholders’ litigation rights. 
Cf. Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 108 Cal. App. 4th 47, 57 (2003) (holding that, under 
California law, shareholder agreement purporting to waive shareholders’ right to sue for 
breach of fiduciary duty was void). 
101 Rauterberg, supra note 13 at 4 
102 See id. at 19 (examining shareholder agreements filed by newly-public firms in 
connection with their initial public offerings and inferring from this data, that “private 
companies, even mature ones, are routinely subject to shareholder agreements.”). 
103 National Venture Capital Association, supra note 97. 
104 Corp. Law Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 98, at 
1172-94. 
105 See, e.g. id. at 1182 (explaining that “case law concerning the enforceability of drag-
along rights is scarce”) 




Shareholder agreements play an important role with respect to the 
governance of venture-capital funded starts-ups.  Their main purpose is 
to provide VC investors with greater control over the corporation than 
that associated with their economic interest.108  As a result, they may 
provide major shareholders with veto rights over corporate transactions, 
determine the composition of the board of directors, facilitate the 
coordination of minority shareholders into control groups, and provide 
financial rights with respect to structural changes.109   
Shareholder agreements also govern the rights of employee-
shareholders.110  A substantial percentage of employee compensation in 
large privately-held companies takes the form of stock and stock 
options.111   Shareholder agreements may be used in this context to 
compel employees to sell their shares in a merger or to give the 
employee the right to join a sale by the majority shareholder of its 
shares.112  They can set the terms of sale when an employee leaves the 
company.113  They may also affect the rights of employee-shareholders 
by limiting their information rights, litigation rights or their ability to 
seek appraisal.114  By way of example, a shareholder of Juul, a privately-
 
108 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 14 (“The ultimate purpose of a shareholder agreement is 
to provide a VC with rights above and beyond what it would have simply by virtue of 
its overall percentage ownership of the company.”). 
109 See also John F. Coyle, Altering Rules, Cumulative Voting, and Venture Capital, 
2016 UTAH L. REV. 595, 606-8 (2016) (explaining how participants in California 
corporations can use shareholder agreements to eliminate the statutorily required 
cumulative voting). 
110 See Shareholder’s agreement: Employee equity, SparkUp, June 15, 2017, 
https://medium.com/@SparkUp/shareholders-agreement-employee-equity-
9704b94c83e3 
111 See Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-up Employees, 2019 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 867, 880-881 (“a growing number of employees have started accepting 
compensation agreements in which equity grants represent a significant proportion of 
their pay”); Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse? 
107 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107 (2019) (describing historical practice by start-ups of 
compensating their employees largely with stock options).  As Alon-Beck notes, these 
employees face delayed liquidity as start-ups remain private for extended periods of 
time.  Id. at 112.   
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See, e.g. Roy Shapira, Corporate Law, Retooled: How Books and Records 
Revamped Judicial Oversight, __  CARDOZO L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (describing 




held corporation, who received stock pursuant to employee stock 
options, filed suit against Juul’s directors alleging various breaches of 
fiduciary duty.115  In connection with that litigation, the shareholder 
sought to exercise his statutory inspection rights.116  Juul filed a 
declaratory judgment action, asserting that the stockholder had waived 
his inspection rights pursuant to the shareholder agreement that he 
executed in order to receive the option grant.117  As discussed in subpart 
B below, the extent to which courts will enforce such a waiver is unclear. 
 
B. Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements 
 
 As noted above, historically, courts viewed shareholder 
agreements with suspicion.118  In a number of early cases, courts held 
that, as a matter of common law, shareholder agreements were 
“unenforceable as they were against public policy.”119  Corporate law 
shifted from this early position, however, to accept shareholder 
agreements both through a change in the common law and as a result of 
statutory provisions expressly authorizing the use of shareholder 
agreements.120   
 The common law evolution toward a general acceptance of 
shareholder agreements reflected three principles.  First, as noted above, 
early cases typically involved the use of shareholder agreements in close 
corporations.  In that context, many courts recognized both that close 
corporations differed substantially from large public companies and that 
shareholder agreements were a legitimate way of meeting their 
 
115 Daniel Grove v. Adam Bowen, et al., Case No. CGC-20-582059 (Super. Ct. CA), 
Jan. 7, 2020, 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X2DHAOPV58K9EU98UFD
A50UR7DJ/download?fmt=pdf 
116 See Hailey Konnath, Juul Says Investor Waived His Right to Inspect Its Books, 
LAW360, Jan. 9, 2020. 
117 JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Daniel Grove, Docket No. 2020-0005 (Del. Ch. Jan 06, 2020), 
118 See supra notes __ through __ and accompanying text.  See also Rainer Kulms, A 
Shareholder′s Freedom of Contract in Close Corporations - Shareholder Agreements in 
the USA and Germany, 2 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 685 (2001). 
119 Id. at 686. 
120 See, e.g. Oceanic Exploration Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1981) 
(explaining that, although historically the law had viewed contractual arrangements that 
interfered with stock ownership with suspicion, “The desire for flexibility in modern 
society has altered such restrictive thinking”).  
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distinctive needs.121  Second, recognition of shareholder agreements was 
consistent with the general principle of freedom of contract. 122  Third, 
courts in many cases reasoned that shareholder agreements were 
personal, not corporate in nature.  As a result, even a shareholder 
agreement that was arguably inconsistent with a mandatory corporate 
law could be understood as simply a personal agreement not to invoke 
that rule.123     
In addition, corporation statutes validated some types of 
shareholder agreements.124  Both the Delaware statute and the MBCA 
expressly authorize voting agreements among shareholders and provide 
that they are specifically enforceable.125  The statutes do not limit voting 
agreements to close corporations, and, although the statutes originally 
required that voting agreements be publicly disclosed and limited their 
duration to ten years, subsequent amendments removed these limits.  
Based on these statutes, courts have broadly upheld shareholder voting 
agreements126 as long as their terms are sufficiently clear.127   
The Delaware statute does not explicitly address other forms of 
shareholder agreements,128 but MBCA § 7.32 authorizes shareholder 
 
121 See, e.g., 9 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 114.01 (Matthew 
Bender 2020) (describing “the evolving law of shareholder agreements in close 
corporations”). 
122 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 237 (1991) (explaining that freedom of contract is particularly 
appropriate in the context of close corporations). 
123 See, e.g., Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
319, *11. 
124 Close corporation statutes went further and authorized corporate participants to vary 
or eliminate a variety of standard corporate law requirements through shareholder 
agreements.  See, e.g., George J. Siedel, Close Corporation Law: Michigan, Delaware 
and the Model Act, 11 Del. J. Corp. L. 383, 393-96 (1987) (describing such provisions 
in the Michigan close corporation statute). 
125 Del. Gen. Corp. L. 218(b), MBCA §7.31.   
126 See, e.g., Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 383 (Del. 2014) (explaining that a 
“Voting Agreement acts as a contractual overlay [of Section 212(a)] pursuant to 8 Del. 
C. § 218(c)”).   
127 See, e.g., Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108 
("although Delaware law provides stockholders with a great deal of flexibility to enter 
into voting agreements, our courts rightly hesitate to construe a contract as disabling a 
majority of a corporate electorate from changing the board of directors unless that 
reading of the contract is certain and unambiguous.") 
128 Other state statutes also recognize shareholder agreements and impose various 
procedural requirements.  See, e.g., Booker v. Humphreys, 73 Va. Cir. 543, 551 (2007) 
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agreements that address a variety of issues beyond voting, including 
agreements that limit the discretion of the board of directors, govern 
corporate distributions, and establish who shall serve as directors or 
officers.129  The statute imposes a variety of procedural requirements.130  
Notably, it expressly authorizes shareholder agreements that conflict 
with other provisions in the statute, stating that an agreement that 
complies with § 7.32 is valid “even though it is inconsistent with one or 
more other provisions of this Act.”131   Although § 7.32 is not part of a 
separate close corporation statute, it appears to have been contemplated 
to play an analogous role because it originally provided that shareholder 
agreements authorized by its terms would cease to be effective if the 
corporation went public.132  In 2017, the ABA eliminated this restriction 
however, and the current form of the provision is not limited to private 
companies.133    
As noted above, this Article focuses on the validity and 
enforceability of shareholder agreements outside the close corporation 
context. Close corporation statutes create a separate body of corporation 
law that expressly reflects the quasi-contractual nature of the close 
corporation.  At the same time, the Article rejects the proposition that the 
legal treatment of shareholder agreements should depend on whether a 
corporation has accessed the public capital markets.134  Because 
 
(refusing to enforce shareholder agreement that did not comply with the Virginia 
statutory requirements that it be in writing and signed by all the shareholders).  Various 
sections of the Delaware statute implicitly reference shareholder agreements.  See 
Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, *47 (describing the statute’s 
“distinct itemization of shareholder agreements as a class of documents that, in addition 
to corporate charters and bylaws, fall within the given regulatory ambit”). 
129 MBCA §7.32.  Delaware law contains no similar provision. 
130 MBCA §7.32 (b) & (c).  Rauterberg, supra note 13 at 24 n.89. 
131 MBCA §7.32 (a). Some commentary suggests public policy limits in the statute 
would preclude a shareholder agreement under the Act that purported to eliminate 
director fiduciary duties. See Warren F. Griffin, Jr., Fiduciary Duties of Officers, 
Directors, and Business Owners, https://www.davismalm.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/Griffin_CH8_Fiduciary_Duties.pdf at 38-30. 
132 See  MBCA § 7.32 (d) (2005) (providing that “[a]n agreement authorized by this 
section shall cease to be effective when shares of the corporation are listed on a national 
securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more members 
of a national or affiliated securities association.”).   
133 Rauterberg, supra note 13 at 24 n.89. 
134 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 27  at 339 (observing that the public-
private divide has been undertheorized and questioning the extent to a corporation’s 
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corporations have the ability to opt into the contractual framework of 
close corporation statutes, it is reasonable to treat privately-held 
corporations that either do not qualify for close corporation status or 
have chosen not to avail themselves of those statutes to be subject to the 
same corporate law that applies to public companies.135     
 Few cases have considered the enforceability of shareholder 
agreements outside the close corporation context.136  Two potentially 
conflicting principles apply.  On the one hand, corporate law imposes a 
hierarchy of corporate authority in which the statute is supreme, the 
terms of the charter must comply with the statute, the terms of the 
bylaws are limited by the charter, and a shareholder agreement is not 
valid if it conflicts with any of the foregoing.137 As a result, a 
shareholder agreement that conflicts with the statute should be invalid.138  
 On the other hand, shareholder agreements (unlike corporate 
charters and bylaws) are explicit contracts.  “When parties have ordered 
their affairs voluntarily through a binding contract, Delaware law is 
strongly inclined to respect their agreement, and will only interfere upon 
a strong showing that dishonoring the contract is required to vindicate a 
 
regulatory treatment should be based on the extent to which it has accessed the public 
capital markets). 
135 See, e.g. Abregov v. Lawrence, 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1826, *7 (holding 
that the rules governing the enforceability of shareholder agreements are different for 
statutory close corporations than for other corporations). 
136 In addition, a number of the cases deal with the rights of preferred stockholders, and 
those rights are considered primarily contractual.  See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ford 
Holdings, 698 A.2d 973, 977 (Del. Ch. March 20, 1997) (“the relation between the 
holder of the preferred and the corporation is contractual”). 
137 As the Delaware Chancery court explained, “The by-laws must succumb to the 
superior authority of the charter; the charter if it conflicts with the statute must give 
way; and the statute, if it conflicts with the constitution, is void.”  Gaskill v. Gladys 
Belle Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 289, 296 (1929).  See also Pierre Schroeder, et al. v. Philippe 
Buhannic, et al., C.A. No. 2017-0746-JTL, order (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2018) at 8, 
https://delawarecounselgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/pierre-schroeder-et-al.-
v.-Philippe-Buhannic.pdf (explaining that a shareholder agreement is invalid if it 
conflicts with the statute).  See also Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 307, *9 (Del. Ch. August 14, 2019) (describing and rejecting 
petitioners’ argument that corporate law consists of “a hierarchy, in which the DGCL 
resides at the top, followed by a corporation's certificate of incorporation, then its 
bylaws, and then other contracts (such as the SA at issue here)”). 
138 Pierre Schroeder, et al. v. Philippe Buhannic, et al., C.A. No. 2017-0746-JTL, order 




public policy interest even stronger than freedom of contract.”139 As the 
Delaware Supreme Court explained, this approach is “in keeping with 
the goal of Delaware law to "ensure freedom of contract and promote 
clarity in the law [and thus] facilitate commerce."140   
 If shareholder agreements are contractual, can they be used to 
circumvent mandatory provisions of corporate law?141  Outside of 
corporate law, courts generally accept the premise that private parties 
may, by contract, waive statutory, and even constitutional rights.142 
Several courts suggest that the same analysis applies to shareholder 
agreements,143 at least so long as the waiver of statutory rights in a 
shareholder agreement is “clear and unmistakable.”144   
  One example is statutory inspection rights.  In several cases, 
courts have held that corporations cannot eliminate shareholder 
 
139 ev3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 529 n. 3 (2014), quoting Libeau v. Fox, 880 A.2d 
1049, 1056-57 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd in pertinent part, 892 A.2d 1068 (Del. 2006) 
140 Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354 (Del. 2014).  Moreover, Delaware is not alone 
in broadly upholding shareholder agreements based on the policy of freedom of 
contract. See, e.g., George Bellas, What's the Purpose of a Shareholders' Agreement, 
https://www.bellas-wachowski.com/whats-the-purpose-of-a-shareholders-
agreement.html (“Illinois has a strong history of upholding shareholders’ agreements 
pursuant to the underlying policy regarding freedom of contract.”); Galler v. Galler, 32 
Ill.2d 16 (1964). 
141 See Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, *58 (Del. 
Ch. July 21, 2000) (“stockholders can bind themselves contractually in a stockholders 
agreement in a manner that cannot be permissibly accomplished through a certificate of 
incorporation”). 
142 See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
431, 475-480 (1993) describing U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of private parties’ 
power to waive various statutory and constitutional protections). 
143 See Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 307, 
*10 n. 29 (Del. Ch. August 14, 2019) (citing cases).  See also Bonanno v. VTB 
Holdings, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (allowing enforcement of provision in 
shareholder agreement waiving shareholders’ right to litigate in Delaware courts, 
despite explicit statutory language prohibiting such a waiver in a corporate charter or 
bylaw). 
144 See, e.g., Windmill Inns of Am., Inc. v. Cauvin, 299 Ore. App. 567, 576; accord 
Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 125 (“There can be no waiver of a 
statutory right unless that waiver is clearly and affirmatively expressed in the relevant 
document”); Cf. Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2019 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 307, *11 (finding that shareholder agreement “clearly and unambiguously 
waives appraisal rights;”) 
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inspection rights through a charter or bylaw provision.145  Nonetheless, 
as the Juul litigation shows,146 corporation are seeking to do so through 
shareholder agreements.147  Although the courts have not expressly 
upheld these provisions, dicta in several cases suggests their potential 
willingness to uphold such waivers as enforceable.148  Another example 
is appraisal rights, which the Manti court held could be waived pursuant 
to a shareholder agreement.149    
 One argument is that shareholder agreements are different from 
charter or bylaw provisions in that they are personal waivers of statutory 
rights, that is, they do not eliminate shareholder inspection rights but 
merely constitute the agreement of an individual signatory to the 
agreement not to exercise those rights.  Thus the Manti court reasoned 
that although the shareholders waived their right to appraisal rights, the 
 
145 See e.g., State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 88 (1926) 
(holding that a charter provision that “permits the directors to deny any examination of 
the company's records by a stockholder is unauthorized and ineffective,”); Rainbow 
Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1987) (“The 
shareholders' right of inspection can only be taken away by statutory enactment”); BBC 
Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Medical, Inc., 623 A.2d 85, 90 (a shareholder’s 
inspection rights “cannot be abridged or abrogated by an act of the corporation.” 
146 Konnath, supra note 116. 
147 See, e.g., Shapira, supra note 114 (“explaining that “a burgeoning practice among 
growing start-ups is to sign employees on an inspection rights waiver before granting 
said employees stock options”); George Geis, Information Litigation in Corporate Law, 
71 ALA. L. REV. 407, 427 (2019) (“Corporations are even starting to include conditions 
in employee stock grants that require workers to waive future shareholder inspection 
rights”); Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke Obscure Law to Open Up Books, 
WALL ST. J., May 24, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employees-invoke-
obscure-law-to-open-up-books-1464082202 (quoting executive compensation attorney 
Richard Grimm as stating that “Some companies are now pushing employees to waive 
their right to inspect the books as a condition for receiving stock awards”). 
148 See e.g., Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 125 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(observing that the shareholders agreement “does not expressly provide for a waiver of 
statutory inspection rights [and] there can be no waiver of a statutory right unless that 
waiver is clearly and affirmatively expressed . . . .”); Schoon v. Troy Corp., 2006 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 123, *7 (rejecting argument that shareholder’s section 220 rights were 
defined by the stock purchase agreement where “[t]he agreement did not in any way, 
explicitly or implicitly, contractually limit the information that must be provided to 
Steel in the exercise of its statutorily protected inspection rights under Section 220.”). 
149 Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 319. 
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waiver did not have the effect of altering the terms of the petitioner’s 
stock.150   
 The problem with this analysis is that these shareholder 
agreements address corporate governance rather than merely an 
individual shareholder’s rights.  A shareholder’s agreement that limits 
the authority of shareholders to remove sitting directors, limits the 
potential accountability of the board.  An agreement to waive inspection 
rights prevent shareholders from overseeing the corporation’s financial 
condition and responding to potential problems.  An agreement to 
forsake appraisal rights affects the terms of future transactions.  In this 
sense, shareholder agreements affect not merely the rights of non-
signatory shareholders but also the rights of the corporation’s officers, 
directors and non-shareholder stakeholders.   
 Moreover, if all shareholders must agree to the terms of the 
shareholder agreement as a condition of acquiring stock, it is misleading 
to characterize the agreement as purely personal.  If the agreement 
requires them to waive their statutory rights, then no shareholder is 
capable of exercising those rights and, as a practical matter then, the 
corporation has eliminated them.  Thus, in Manti, if all shareholders 
waive their appraisal rights, the common stock effectively has no 
appraisal rights. To the extent the elimination of statutory appraisal 
rights is inconsistent with public policy, the prospect of obtaining this 
result through a contractual waiver appears problematic. 
 To be sure, some shareholder agreements are more limited in 
scope.  In Alter Bioscience, the court considered a covenant in a 
shareholder agreement waiving the plaintiffs’ right to sue.151  The 
plaintiffs argued that enforcement of the covenants would essentially 
insulate the defendants from claims of breach of fiduciary duty and were 
therefore void as against public policy.152  In evaluating and rejecting 
this claim, the court observed that, in the case before it, the agreements 
only bound the plaintiffs; other shareholders were able to sue and were, 
 
150 Id. at *11 (“The SA, in other words, did not restrict the appraisal rights of the classes 
of stock held by the Petitioners”) 
151 In re Altor Bioscience Corp., C.A. No. 2017-0466-JRS (Del. Ch. May 15, 2019) 
(TRANSCRIPT).  
152 Katherine Henderson, Amy Simmerman, & Brad Sorrel, Appraisal Claim Waivers 




in fact, asserting similar claims to those the plaintiffs sought to assert.153  
Consequently, the court concluded that enforcement of the agreements 
against the plaintiffs was not contrary to public policy.154  The 
conclusion, however, is overly facile.  To the extent that minority or 
disempowered shareholders waive their rights, the fact that other 
shareholders have the technical ability to assert these claims does not 
ensure accountability. 
 An additional challenge is that, as noted above, the case law 
provides limited guidance on the extent to which statutory provisions are 
mandatory or enabling.  The Manti court confronted this question.  As 
the court explained:  
 
I note that the DGCL does not explicitly prohibit 
contractual modification or waiver of appraisal rights, nor 
does it require a party to exercise its statutory appraisal 
rights. Thus, such modification or waiver serves to 
supplement the DGCL, and is not inconsistent with, nor 
contrary to, the DGCL.155 
 
The court’s treatment of this issue reflects the lack of certainty by the 
courts regarding how to distinguish between mandatory and enabling 
statutory provisions.  Specifically, does the absence of statutory language 
that expressly authorizes private ordering imply that the provision in 
question is mandatory?   
 The court’s analysis in Bonanno went further.156  Bonanno 
concerned the enforceability of a New York forum selection provision in 
a shareholder agreement.  Notably, 8 Del. § 115 expressly prohibits 
charter and bylaw provisions that adopt an exclusive non-Delaware 
forum for the litigation of internal corporate claims.  Nonetheless, as the 
Bonanno court noted, the statute does not forbid such provisions in 
 
153 Katherine Henderson, et al., Delaware Court Addresses Private Company Deal 




155 Manti at *11. 
156 Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, *47 
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shareholder agreements.157  Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
shareholder agreement did not contravene public policy.158   
 Although Manti dealt with common stock, several cases have 
emphasized that the scope of what is mandatory may be different for 
preferred stock.159   The rationale of these courts is that preferred 
stockholders’ rights are primarily contractual rather than statutory. Thus 
the court in Ford Holdings, although observing that 8 Del. §262 is a 
mandatory provision of Delaware corporate law, nonetheless concluded 
that the rights of preferred stockholders could nonetheless be modified 
by contract. 160  The court expressly conditioned its holding on the fact 
that “preferred stock is a very special case.”161 Similarly the court in 
Metromedia explained that the “proposition of contract interpretation for 
preferred stock is interwoven with a stockholder’s statutory right of 
appraisal.”162  As a result, the court concluded that a contractual 
provision establishing the fair value of the preferred stock was not 
inconsistent with either the language or the policy of section 262.163  In 
Fletcher International Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., the court applied 
similar reasoning to conclude that the contractual duties owed to 
preferred stockholders in the case supplanted any fiduciary duty claims 
that might result in additional remedies.164   
 
 
157 The court noted that, although shareholder agreements are not referenced in the 
statutory text, a synopsis included with the bill stated “Section 115 is not intended, 
however, to prevent the application of any such provision in a stockholders agreement 
or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be 
enforced” Id. at *46 n.131, citing Del. S.B. 75 syn., 148th Gen. Assem. (2015).  Accord 
Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 117 n. 65 (Del. 2020).  
158 Bonanno, 2016 De. Ch. Lexis, at *48, 
159 See Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(questioning whether the reasoning in Ford Holdings could be used to limit the rights of 
common, as opposed to preferred, stockholders). 
160 In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings., Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. 
Ch.1997) (explaining that “Among the[] mandatory provisions of Delaware law is 
Section 262”); id. at 975 (“insofar as preferred stock is concerned, the provisions of 
Section 262 may be modified by provisions of the certificate of rights,”). 
161 Id. at 977.   
162 In re Appraisal Metromedia Int'l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch.2009). 
163 Id. at 900 
164 Fletcher Int'l, Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *26 
(holding that asserted fiduciary duty claims “arise out of and are superfluous to the 
breach of contract claims”). 
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III. The Problems with Shareholder Agreements 
 
A. Shareholder Agreements and the Corporate/Contract 
Paradigm 
 
 As Part I explained, courts generally describe corporate law as 
“contractual.” The contract analogy is imperfect, however.   As William 
Bratton and Michael Wachter recognize, the law has struggled to 
reconcile “two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract 
law.”165  Shareholder agreements sit uneasily between these two 
paradigms.  On the one hand, they purport to function as contracts and, 
as such, have been subjected to legal analysis based on principles of 
contract law.  On the other hand, the powers and rights that they address 
are the product of corporate law.166 
 There are fundamental differences between the two paradigms.  
Contract law is party-based.  In general, contracts only affect the legal 
rights of signatories to the contract, contract law explicitly disclaims, in 
most cases, the ability to create rights or obligations with respect to third 
parties.167  Contracts provide the primary source of rights and 
responsibilities between the parties thereto and, to the extent that 
statutory provisions and public policy considerations limit the 
permissible scope of contract terms, those limitations are minimal.  
Contracts are self-defining in terms of their scope – they determine the 
duration of the obligations they impose, the manner in which the contract 
can be modified168 and the circumstances under which the contract may 
be terminated.169 
 
165 William Bratton & Michael Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1815, 1820 (2013). 
166 See also David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory 
of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013) (describing corporations as 
neither public nor private but “corporate.”) 
167 See, e.g., Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 445 (Tex. May 19, 
2017) (concluding that non-signatories to a shareholder agreement lacked the power to 
enforce its terms).  
168 See, e.g., id. at 443 (holding that signatory to a shareholder agreement was bound by 
changes to that agreement pursuant to its terms). 
169 The potential for termination is a key distinction between shareholder agreements 
and charter and bylaw provisions.  A charter or bylaw continues in effect unless and 
until it is amended or removed.  Shareholder agreements may provide for formal 
termination of the contract or revocation of individual shareholders’ agreement to its 
terms.  Contractual silence on these points need not eliminate the potential for 
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 Consent is a central component of contract law.170  Contract law 
“requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which 
they have agreed.”171  A binding contract requires affirmative assent; 
silence or inaction is not generally sufficient.172  The requirement of 
consent limits the ability of one party unilaterally to modify the 
contract.173  And, where a contract purports to waive a party’s statutory 
or constitutional rights, that waiver must be explicit. 
 Corporate law, by contrast, is structural.  Statutes prescribe the 
necessary formalities to form a corporation and, once those formalities 
are complied with, establish the corporation as a distinct legal entity.174  
Corporate law also specifies the resulting entity’s specify critical 
features.175  State law identifies the key participants in a corporation – 
the officers, directors and shareholders – and allocates rights and 
responsibilities among those parties based on status, not agreement.  The 
board of directors, for example, has primary authority to operate the 
corporation.  Shareholders have the right to elect directors.  The board 
and the shareholders must act jointly to undertake certain actions such as 
amending the charter or approving a merger.  Although many features of 
 
revocation.  Thus in Roam-Tel Partners, the Chancery court held that, in a short-form 
merger, absent prejudice to the company, a stockholder could revoke his prior waiver of 
appraisal rights in a shareholder agreement so long as the revocation occurred within 
the statutory period prescribed for perfecting those rights.  Roam-Tel Partners v. AT&T 
Mobility, C.A. 5745-VCS (Del. Ch. December 17, 2010). 
170 See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 
MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 10 (1998) (consent is “a mandatory requisite of any valid 
agreement”). Rnady E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (describing importance of consent in contract 
theory and identifying circumstances under which parties may be understood to consent 
to contractual default rules). 
171 Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 99 A.3d 306, 313 (N.J. 2014) 
172 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (“Acceptance by 
silence is exceptional.”) 
173 See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th 779, 790 (1998); Discover 
Bank v. Shea, 362 N.J. Super. 200, 204–07 (2001). 
174 See Ciepley, supra  note 166 at 141 (explaining that a corporation relates to outside 
parties “as an independent contracting individual, with property and liability wholly 
separate from its members”); Id. at 144 (identifying “asset lock-in, entity-shielding, and 
limited liability” as  features that “preserv[e] the corporation as a separate contracting 
individual”). 
175 Id. at 141. 
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the relationship among these participants can be modified by contract, 
some cannot.176   
 Corporation statutes both supply default rules that govern the 
rights and responsibilities of corporate participants and specify the 
mechanism by which those default rules can be modified.  Most 
corporation statutes, for example, explicitly provide that statutory 
amendments are binding upon existing corporations.177  Statutes 
typically require the joint agreement of the board of directors and the 
shareholders to approve charter amendments and, in some cases, require 
the vote even of a class of shareholders that does not otherwise have 
voting rights to approve amendments that would adversely affect the 
rights of that class.  Statutes typically provide default rules regarding the 
power to amend the bylaws and specify how a corporation can modify 
that default rule.178   
 Unlike contract law, corporate law explicitly addresses the rights 
of third parties – most importantly through the principle of limited 
liability, which provides entity-level treatment for corporate obligations 
in tort and contract.  Limited liability means that corporate participants – 
including officers, directors and shareholders – are not personally liable 
for the corporation’s obligations to third parties.  Other aspects of 
corporate law also affect third party interests such as statutory provisions 
that limit the conditions under which a corporation may pay dividends.  
Commentators increasingly argue that corporate law includes 
responsibilities to stakeholders such as employees, customers and 
suppliers,179 and a majority of states have adopted constituency statutes 
 
176 See, e.g., Boilermakers, 73 A.2d at 955–56 (describing the shareholders’ power to 
amend the bylaws under Delaware law as “indefeasible” and sacrosanct”).   
177 See Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues 
and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C.L. REV. 687, 724-30 (1998) (describing such 
provisions as standard).  For example, 8 Del. § 394 reserves to the legislature the right 
to amend the statute and provides that such amendments shall be part of the charter of 
every corporation so long as they do not take away a remedy or liability that has “been 
previously incurred”).     
178 See, e.g., Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.057(c) (West 2015) (“A corporation’s 
board of directors may amend or repeal bylaws or adopt new bylaws unless: (1) the 
corporation’s certificate of formation or this code wholly or partly reserves the power 
exclusively to the corporation’s shareholders . . . .”). 
179 See, e.g., Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a 





that explicitly authorize directors to consider stakeholder interests in 
making corporate decisions.180  
 Finally, corporate law operates under the principle of implied 
consent rather than explicit consent.  Shareholders invest in a corporation 
with the constructive knowledge of the rules of the game – the binding 
effect of the statute, charter and bylaws.181  They invest with the 
knowledge that those rules can be changed and, by investing, consent to 
changes that conform to the corporate law mechanisms for changing 
these rules, including the adoption of new statutes, and amendments to 
the charter and bylaws.182  This consent is necessarily implicit, but it is 
nonetheless binding.  A shareholder cannot be heard to complain about 
the board’s adoption of a bylaw pursuant to a charter that gives the board 
the power to amend the bylaws, even if the shareholder lacked 
knowledge of the relevant charter provision.  The role of implied consent 
highlights “the tension between corporate law principles - which 
generally impute to members of the corporation knowledge and 
acceptance of corporate bylaws - and the law of contracts, which requires 
consent to be bound.”183   
 It is efficient for corporate law to incorporate implied consent 
because it means both that shareholders implicitly consent to the 
authority delegated to the board of directors to make operational 
decisions and that shareholder decisions can be made by majority vote.  
Minority interests neither have the power to block a decision with which 
they disagree nor the right to exit the corporation as a result of that 
disagreement.  These features allow passive investors to finance 
 
that corporations should be run for the benefit of all stakeholders – customers, 
employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.). 
180 Christopher Geczy, et al. Institutional Investing When Shareholders are not 
Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 95 (2015) (reporting that, as of publication date, 33 
states had constituency statutes). 
181 See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 
939-40 (Del. Ch. 2013) (reasoning that shareholders invested with constructive notice 
that state law and a company’s “certificates of incorporation gave the boards the power 
to adopt and amend bylaws unilaterally” and that such bylaws “are binding on the 
stockholders.”) 
182 See Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U.L. REV. 485, 497-
498 (2016) (“Unlike in other contracting contexts, the rationale is not that shareholders 
have consented to the terms, but rather that they have consented to the corporate 
governance structure that gave rise to them.”). 
183 Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 162-163 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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corporations in a manner that would not be possible through formal 
multi-lateral contracts.   
 
B. The Significance of Corporate Law in Analyzing 
Shareholder Agreements 
 
  Although, as indicated above, some courts have relied primarily 
on contract law in analyzing the validity of shareholder agreements, this 
analysis is incomplete to the extent it does not also incorporate corporate 
law principles. Shareholder agreements are increasingly used as tools of 
private ordering, to create, waive and modify the rights and 
responsibilities of corporate participants – rights and responsibilities 
such as the responsibility of the board of directors to run the corporation 
or the right of shareholders to exercise inspection or appraisal rights, that 
are the product of corporate law.   
 Although they are used as a tool of private ordering, shareholder 
agreements lack the structural protections of charter and bylaw 
provisions.  They are not a part of the corporation’s formal governing 
documents.  The legal principles that apply in case of conflict between 
the shareholder agreement and those documents are unclear.  They are 
not created or modified according to corporate law procedures, and the 
doctrine of implied consent does not apply.  Perhaps most 
problematically, shareholder agreements govern the signatories’ rights in 
an individualized manner.  Not all shareholders may be signatories to the 
same shareholder agreements and, even among signatories, not all may 
be bound. Similarly, corporate participants who are not parties to a 
shareholder agreement may not be able to enforce it.184  As a result, 
unlike a charter or bylaw provision, a shareholder agreement may cause 
shareholders with the same economic interest to have different rights.185   
 These features go a long way to explaining why the use of 
shareholder agreements is more common in private companies than in 
publicly-traded firms.  Small private companies often fail to operate 
according to the formalities of corporate law, and the relationships 
 
184 See, e.g., Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 443-44 (Tex. Sup. 
2017) (refusing to allow enforcement of forum selection provision in shareholders’ 
agreement by non-signatories). 
185 See, e.g., Henry v. Phixios Holdings, Inc., 2017 WL 2928034 (Del. Ch. July 10, 
2017) (finding that shareholder was not bound by a shareholder agreement when he 
acquired stock without knowledge of transfer restrictions contained in that agreement). 
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among the parties are often highly personal.186  Many corporate 
participants fill multiple roles in the close corporation, which is also 
typified by substantial shareholder participation in management.187  The 
contract paradigm thus dominates as a practical, if not a legal matter.  It 
is unsurprising that close corporation statutes, which are designed 
specifically for this type of business, explicitly authorize broad use of 
shareholder agreements.188   
 Many private corporations operate very differently from the 
prototypical close corporation, however.  They have centralized 
management, hundreds of shareholders many of whom are passive 
investors, and shares that are frequently traded, albeit not in the public 
markets.189  There are currently close to 600 so-called “unicorns,” private 
corporations with a valuation of $1 billion or more.190  Modifications to 
the federal securities laws have made it easier for these companies to 
grow and access capital from a wide range of sources without becoming 
public companies.191  As commentators have observed, private 
companies are not subject to mandatory disclosure requirements limiting 
the ability of both shareholders and regulators to exercise oversight.192  
There are reasons to believe that large private companies systematically 
 
186 See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete 
Contracting: The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329 1405-6 
(2003) (describing the “deformalization” of the close corporation and arguing that 
corporate formalities can serve as important self-regulation mechanisms). 
187 Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in 
Corporate Governance: Too Little, but not Too Late, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 379, 435 n. 349 
(1994) (“In most close corporations, the shareholders play a significant role in 
management.”). 
188 Many privately-held corporations, however, do not qualify to use close corporation 
statutes and, of those that qualify, a substantial percentage do not elect close 
corporation status.  See supra note 30. 
189 See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 27 at 349-50 (describing the growth 
of platforms that facilitate the trading of private company stock). 
190 As of July 11, 2020, Crunchbase listed 601 companies in the Crunchbase Unicorn 
List.  See The Crunchbase Unicorn List,  https://www.crunchbase.com/lists/the-
crunchbase-unicorn-list/1e409c7c-010c-4997-a41e-e2d273437da4/identifiers. (last 
visited July 11, 2020). 
191 See De Fontenay, supra note 24 (describing regulatory factors leading to the growth 
of large private companies). 
192 See Rauterberg, supra note 13 at 4 (terming private companies “the dark matter of 
the corporate universe.”). 
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have poor governance practices relative to their publicly-traded peers, a 
problem Renee Jones terms the “Unicorn Governance Trap.”193   
 The use of shareholder agreements in this context raises 
particular concerns.194  One is the lack of transparency associated with 
private ordering via shareholder agreements.195  Private companies are 
not subject to SEC-mandated disclosure, providing a degree of insulation 
from public oversight.196  Whether the extent of that insulation is 
efficient or not, statutory inspection rights partially fill the gap by 
affording shareholders some level of access to corporate information.  
This information can provide a variety of benefits including reducing 
agency costs and exposing business practices that are socially harmful or 
even illegal.197   
 Shareholder agreements, however, are commonly used to limit 
shareholder inspection rights, further reducing the accountability of 
managers and controlling stockholders.  Similarly, shareholder 
agreements are themselves opaque.  Corporate charters, even in private 
firms, are publicly available,198 and it is generally understood that 
shareholders have a near-absolute right to inspect the current bylaws of 
the corporation without relying on any statutory inspection rights.199  By 
 
193 Jones, supra note 33. See also  
194 See id. at 170 (explaining that unicorns are “insulated both from the investor control 
that typifies private company governance and the public scrutiny and oversight that 
accompanies an IPO”). 
195 Corporate charter and bylaw provisions “are available for the public to inspect while 
the shareholder agreement is typically private, shared only by the parties involved.”  
LegalNature.com, https://www.legalnature.com/guides/articles-of-incorporation-and-
shareholder-agreements-whats-the-difference. 
196 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note at 361 (arguing that existing limitations on 
required disclosure are arbitrary and further observing that disclosure is a public good 
that provides benefits to parties other than shareholders). 
197 See id. at 367 (identifying potential benefits to increased disclosure). 
198 See Fan, supra note 95 at 611 (observing that “Although anyone can obtain a 
corporation's certificate of incorporation from the Secretary of State of Delaware, there 
is a fee, and the certificate of incorporation does not include significant information 
about the company.”). 
199 See, e.g., 13 P.L.E. CORPORATIONS § 110 (2019)(“explaining that “The statute does 
not refer expressly to the bylaws because the shareholders have an absolute right to be 
supplied with a copy of the currently effective text of the bylaws without going through 
this statutory procedure regarding inspection”); 14 NY JUR. BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 
386 (2) (“While the right of a stockholder to examine the bylaws of the company is not 
absolute but rests in the discretion of the court, a strong case will be required to deny an 
inspection since the bylaws constitute a part of the contract between the stockholder 
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contrast, shareholder agreements have the legal status of contracts and, 
as such, they do not need to be disclosed to non-signatories or filed with 
the state.200   
 The absence of disclosure limits the ability of shareholders to 
ascertain both the economic and the governance rights of their fellow 
shareholders.  Because provisions in shareholder agreements may afford 
some shareholders different economic rights from others, a shareholder 
cannot readily determine the value of his stock or options without access 
to their terms.  As Gornall and Strebulaev demonstrate empirically, 
contractual rights that are “virtually invisible to employees under the 
current disclosure regime, have a dramatic influence on the value of the 
common stock “201  Nonetheless, existing law does not require the 
disclosure of such rights if they are based on shareholder agreements.202 
 Shareholder agreements further undermine both the transparency 
of corporate ownership and the operation of shareholders’ governance 
rights.203  A key component of corporate governance is collective 
shareholder action.  Shareholders can, through the voting process, elect 
and remove directors, amend the bylaws and approve structural changes 
such as mergers.  The corporate charter and bylaws establish 
mechanisms for shareholder voting such as the process for calling a 
shareholder meeting, the quorum requirement for such a meeting to be 
valid, and the voting threshold necessary to effect certain corporate 
decisions. Corporation statutes also afford shareholders the right to 
inspect a shareholder list, so that they can ascertain who has control of 
 
and the corporation, and the stockholder should be permitted to know the extent and 
terms of the stockholder's and the corporation's obligation to each other”).  But see 
Rauterberg, supra note 13 at 4 (observing that private companies “are not required to 
publicly disclose any instrument of governance beyond filing their charter with the 
Secretary of State”).  
200 A public corporation may be required to disclose a material shareholder agreement 
to which it is a party under the federal securities laws.  See Rauterberg, supra note 13 
(describing disclosure requirement). 
201 Aran, supra note 111 at 911-12, citing William Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, 
Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 135 J. FIN. ECON. 120 (2020). 
202 Aran, supra note 111. 
203 Even in public companies, the reallocation of control rights is fraught and frequently 
generates litigation.  See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual 
Class and the Limits of Judicial Review, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 942-45 (2020) 




the corporation, solicit the support of their fellow shareholders and price 
the risks associated with changes in stock ownership.204    
 A shareholder agreement may, for example, create a control 
block by obligating certain shareholders to vote together.205  A 
shareholder agreement may provide some shareholders with the power to 
select or remove corporate officers, undermining the powers of the board 
of directors, Indeed, the terms of a shareholder agreement may have the 
effect of enabling participants in a corporation to evade the otherwise-
applicable thresholds for corporate decisions.  For example, a 
corporation statute may require a merger to be approved by a majority of 
the outstanding shares.206  A shareholder agreement may, through the 
application of drag-along rights, require some shareholders to approve a 
merger at the behest of their fellow shareholders, allowing, in some 
circumstances, shareholders with a minority of the voting power to 
effectuate a transaction.207 
 The absence of formal disclosure requirements coupled with the 
fact that shareholder agreements, unlike charters and bylaws, only bind 
signatories, also makes it possible for a corporation to distinguish among 
shareholders and to provide different shareholders, even those holding 
the same class of stock, with different rights and powers.  Substantial 
shareholders and those with significant bargaining power may be able to 
contract for rights that are not shared by other shareholders.  These rights 
can include typical shareholder rights such as inspection rights, the 
opportunity to observe board meetings or participate in operational 
decisions, or rights with respect to the sale or liquidity of their shares.  
By contrast, small shareholders may be forced to give up significant 
rights in order to invest. Some of these shareholders may lack the 
sophistication to understand the implications of the contracts that they 
are forced to sign.  Employees who receive stock or options as a 
 
204 Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management 
by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 340 (1996) 
(Describing shareholders’ statutory inspection rights and explaining that “shareholders' 
qualified rights to obtain a stocklist and inspect corporate books and records are 
accepted in every state.”). 
205 See Rauterberg, supra note 13. 
206 See, e.g., 8 Del. §251. 
207 See, e.g., Shannon Wells Stevenson, Note: The Venture Capital Solution to the 
Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1161 
(2001) (explaining how a minority shareholder can use drag-along rights to effect a sale 
of the company over the objection of other shareholders). 
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substantial component of their compensation are likely to be particularly 
vulnerable.     
 These differential rights differ markedly from the standard 
corporate law principle that the rights of shareholders are not personal 
but run with the shares, and that the rights associated with a share of 
stock do not based on the ownership of that share.  Corporate law is 
predicated on the proposition of equal treatment of shareholders,208 it and 
requires not merely that differential treatment be based on a different 
financial instrument, but that the terms of that instrument be formalized 
in the corporate charter. 
 Moreover, because the enforceability of shareholder agreements 
depends on contract principles, signatories to a shareholder agreement 
may differ in the extent to which they are bound, depending on their 
individual circumstances.  Shareholders are not all similarly-situated and, 
even in a private corporation, there are substantial differences between 
the knowledge and sophistication of a venture capital fund, a sovereign 
wealth fund, and a former employee – yet all may be shareholders.  
When a shareholder’s consent involves the waiver of statutory rights, 
contract law enforcement requires that the consent be knowing, 
voluntary and uncoerced, a requirement that courts may view differently 
depending on individual shareholder circumstances.  For example, a 
shareholder agreement between a VC fund and the entrepreneur that 
purports to waive certain shareholder rights might be enforced while the 
same provision in an employment agreement or option agreement over 
which a prospective shareholder has limited bargaining power may not. 
At oral argument of a motion to dismiss in Mathieson v. Digital 
Ocean,209 VC Parsons expressed some concern about the validity of such 
a contractual waiver of shareholder rights in an employee stock option 
agreement.  Describing the agreement as potentially a contract of 
adhesion, VC Parsons questioned whether the employees’ assent to the 
terms of that agreement constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
his statutory rights.210 
 
208 See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate 
Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1074 (1083) (terming the 
proposition of equal treatment of shareholders as “part of the received learning about 
publicly held corporations”) 
209 Civil Action No. 11185-VCP (Aug. 27, 2015). 
210 See id., transcript at 29 (“I don't know where on that spectrum it is, and it seems 
conceivable to me that it might make a difference in the enforceability of this waiver.”). 
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 Private ordering through shareholder agreements also creates 
complexity.  As noted above, there is limited case law on the validity of 
specific provisions in shareholder agreements.211  Because they are not 
public, they do not provide similar network effects as charter and bylaw 
provisions which enable firms to see and copy innovative efforts at 
private ordering by their peer firms.  Decisions such as Boilermakers and 
ATP provide clear guidance to market participants on the validity of 
innovative charter and bylaw provisions and enable new governance 
practices to diffuse broadly.212   
 In contrast, cases analyzing shareholder agreements demonstrate 
that their provisions vary substantially, creating interpretive uncertainty.  
In addition, the cases repeatedly caution that their analysis is context-
specific, meaning that other corporate participants cannot readily rely on 
those decisions as to the validity of their own contracts.  In addition to 
the complexity associated with their validity, shareholder agreements 
make it necessary to create, interpret and integrate multiple documents to 
ascertain the scope of various corporate participants’ rights and 
authority.  As the National Venture Capital Association website 
demonstrates, it is common practice for a single corporation to use a 
number of different shareholder agreements, each of which addresses 
different elements of the shareholders’ relationship with his or her fellow 
shareholders and the corporation.213  Separate agreements may address 
voting issues, rights associated with share ownership include preemptive 
rights, redemption rights and registration rights, and rights and 
responsibilities in connection with a merger.  To add to the complexity, 
not every shareholder is a signatory to every shareholder agreement. 
 The use of shareholder agreements also creates the potential for 
opportunism.  Shareholders who relinquish their rights pursuant to a 
 
211 See, e.g. id., transcript at 27 (observing, in trying to assess the validity of a provision 
in a shareholder agreement waiving inspection rights “what's holding me up 
on that issue to some regard, No. 1 is we don't have any case that quite deals with it 
squarely.  We've had some that have recognized the principle, but then for some reason 
or another have held that it wasn't clear and affirmative or they have not found a 
waiver.”). 
212 See, e.g. Smith, et al., supra note 6 at 188 (explaining how private ordering through 
shareholder-adopted bylaws can “create laboratories of corporate governance that 
benefit the entire corporate governance system”).  Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, 
The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIR. 
LEGAL STUD. 31, 32-33 (2017) (documenting diffusion of forum selection bylaws). 
213 National Venture Capital Association, supra note 97. 
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shareholder agreement need not be told the extent to which other 
shareholders are receiving similar treatment.214  The corporation or the 
majority shareholder can negotiate contracts providing an opportunity to 
buy out minority shareholders on different and less-favorable terms.  
More problematically, VC funds and controlling stockholders may view 
legal uncertainty as a basis for overreaching, choosing to include 
aggressive provisions in shareholder agreements despite the absence of 
any legal authority, in the hope or expectation that the inclusion of these 
terms will deter counterparties from asserting their rights.215  The 
potential for unequal bargaining power coupled with the general 
obstacles to shareholder rights litigation in private companies 
compounds this problem.216  These factors may explain the widespread 
use of shareholder agreements despite their uncertain legal status.217  
 
214 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 257, 269 (2015) (observing that the board, officers and controlling 
stockholders “can act opportunistically to pursue self-interested ends, the effects of 
which only they can be fully aware”). 
215 See id. (noting that such players “enjoy important, and likely unerodable, strategic 
advantages” in a system of private ordering). Aggressive efforts to limit shareholder 
rights through shareholder agreements may be similar to the aggressive use of 
contractual waivers in other instances of unequal bargaining power such as 
employer/employee and business/consumer.  See, e.g., Heather Bromfield, Comment: 
The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration 
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315, 333 (2009) (“Lack of contractual mutuality 
runs rampant in situations of unequal bargaining power, such as consumer contracts and 
employee agreements”). 
216 Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1001 (2006) (describing the potential reputational 
costs of litigating against VCs, including future limits on the ability to obtain funding 
from VCs or work at a VC-funded firm); cf. Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The 
Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder Oppression Claims in Venture Capital Start-up 
Companies, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 223, 228 (2005) (predicting future wave of litigation 
by “burned” angel investors but observing that filed cases were limited and none 
survived pre-trial settlement). 
217 Commentators generally argue that corporate participants prefer corporate 
participants typically prefer predictable legal rules upon which they can rely in planning 
business transactions.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s  Jurisprudence 
and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 688 (1992) (describing “the 
necessity that corporate law provide a sufficient level of stability and predictability to 
allow corporate planners to have a high level of confidence as to the law that courts will 
apply to their transactions.”); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 227 (1985) (explaining that efficient 
corporate law reduces the transaction costs of organizing and operating a business). 
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 Analyzing shareholder agreements from a purely contractual 
perspective, as courts have done, fails to account for any of these 
concerns that, from a corporate law perspective, are highly problematic.  
At the same time, the cases fail to identify a rationale for letting 
corporate participants create a tool for private ordering that is 
independent of the statutory framework.  The existing statutory 
framework provides explicit procedures governing the scope, adoption 
and amendment of the charter and bylaws that structure their use for 
private ordering; the justification for bypassing them in favor of private 
contract is unclear. 
 Because public corporations cannot readily use shareholder 
agreements for private ordering,218 allowing them to be used in private 
companies also creates an illogical disparity, a disparity that is 
exacerbated if courts conclude that shareholder agreements can be used 
in ways that charter and bylaw provisions cannot.  Although there may 
be a justification for allowing the type of close corporations that operate 
as incorporated partnerships to depart from the structure and formalities 
of general corporate law, the difference between public and private 
companies is no longer binary.  As noted above, there are an increasing 
number of privately-held corporations whose size, economic impact and 
ownership structure resemble those of public companies and might have 
gone public but for various regulatory and capital market developments.  
Avoiding the disclosure requirements associated with the public capital 
markets has contributed to poor quality corporate governance at some of 
these companies, and to the extent that shareholder agreements reduce 
accountability and transparency, they have the potential to exacerbate 
those shortcomings.219   
 
218 Despite Gabriel Rauterberg’s recent scholarship demonstrating significant use of 
shareholder agreements in public companies, Rauterberg, supra note 13, this use is far 
more limited than in the private company context, largely because of the fact that public 
trading, by its nature, makes it impossible for all shareholders to be signatories to a 
shareholder agreement and therefore bound by its terms. 
219 See Jones, supra note 28 at 167-68 (“in the absence of an impending IPO, Unicorn 
managers and investors lack sufficient incentives to develop governance structures and  
practices appropriate for enterprises of their scale.”); David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan 
Governance problems in private companies – Uber Governance Gone Wild: Epic 
Misbehavior at Uber Technologies, STANFORD CLOSER LOOK SERIES, Dec. 11, 2017, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087371(describing governance 
failures at Uber prior to its IPO). 
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 Finally, shareholder agreements undermine the uniformity and 
predictability associated with the corporate form.  There is a public value 
having corporate law apply to all corporations – public and private.  The 
need for managerial accountability, the mechanisms for addressing 
shareholder collective action problems, concerns about conflicts of 
interest, and the challenges of ensuring that shareholders enter and exit 
the business on fair terms, are not categorically different depending on 
whether a corporation’s securities are traded in the public capital 
markets. The value of a single body of corporate law is increased by the 
freedom that business entities possess to choose a more contract-based 
alternative legal structure such as a statutory close corporation or LLC.  
To the extent that an entity has chosen corporate law, its choice should 
reflect a willingness to be bound by the rules of the corporate form, 
including its mandatory features.   
 These arguments apply specifically to private ordering efforts.  
By situating private ordering within the charter and bylaws, all 
corporations benefit from innovations.220  The visibility of firm-specific 
provisions enables participants in other corporations, scholars and 
regulators to evaluate their validity and efficiency, creates network 
externalities, and fosters standardization.  Commentators can analyze the 
policy implications of a bylaw that purports to limit the scope of 
managerial fiduciary duties.   The capital markets can price the impact of 
a forum selection bylaw.  These benefits lower the transaction costs and 
increase the likely efficiency of firm-specific private ordering.   
 
IV. The Implications of this Analysis 
 
A. Limiting Private Ordering Through Shareholder 
Agreements 
 
 This Article has argued that, to the extent courts have afforded 
corporate participates greater latitude to engage in private ordering 
through shareholder agreements than in the charter and bylaws, that 
latitude is inappropriate. The implications of this article’s analysis of 
shareholder agreements goes further, however.  The relative 
 
220 As noted above, corporate charter and bylaw provisions “are available for the public 
to inspect while the shareholder agreement is typically private, shared only by the 
parties involved.”  LegalNature.com, https://www.legalnature.com/guides/articles-of-
incorporation-and-shareholder-agreements-whats-the-difference    
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disadvantages of shareholder agreements from a corporate law 
perspective suggest that they should be affirmatively disfavored relative 
to the charter and bylaws, the traditional tools of firm-specific private 
ordering.  In other words, even a shareholder agreement which 
implements a provision that would clearly be permissible if contained in 
a charter or bylaw is problematic in that it is opaque, may not apply to all 
shareholders equally, depends for its enforceability on shareholder-
specific attributes such as knowledge and sophistication, and cannot be 
modified through traditional corporate law mechanisms such as the vote 
of a majority of directors or shareholders.   
 This Article therefore argues that courts should limit the 
enforcement of shareholder agreements.  Rather than allowing private 
contracts to substitute for the corporation’s formal organizational 
documents, courts should require that corporations engage in private 
ordering exclusively through the charter and bylaws.  This approach 
would reinforce the corporation’s status as an independent legal entity 
that operates not by means of multi-lateral contracts but according to a 
set of legal principles that include both substantive rules and the 
procedures by which those rules are tailored or modified.  Shareholder 
agreements should be presumptively invalid to the extent they address 
rights or powers that could alternatively be addressed in a charter 
provision or bylaw and should be permissible only when they are limited 
to matters that involve shareholders acting in an individual investor 
capacity. 
 The distinction between private ordering and contracts that deal 
with shareholders in their individual capacity can be ascertained with 
reference to the types of issues that are typically addressed through 
charter and bylaw provisions.  These issues include the scope of director 
and officer fiduciary duties, inspection rights, appraisal rights, forum 
selection provisions and the procedures governing shareholder voting.  
Shareholder agreements could continue to be used to deal with issues 
such as the payment for or financing of stock transactions as well as 
proxies and other individual contractual allocations of voting rights.221   
 
221 Although the contractual allocation of voting rights presents some of the concerns 
identified in this Article, corporate law has a long tradition of allowing shareholders 
freedom to assign their voting rights by contract, a tradition that stems, in part, from the 
recognition that, in exercising their voting rights, shareholders act in a quintessentially 
individual capacity.  Indeed, the Delaware courts have expressly “recognized a 
shareholder’s right to act selfishly in exercising its voting power [and that shareholders] 
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 This Article does not propose to apply this legal standard to 
shareholder agreements that are used in statutory close corporations.  As 
the legislative provisions concerning such entities reflect, close 
corporations operate quite differently from other corporations.  The 
premise behind close corporation statutes is both to recognize that 
difference and to make explicit the fact that such corporations, by virtue 
of electing statutory close corporation status, are to be governed by a 
different set of legal rules than those applicable to other corporations. 
 
B. Facilitating Innovation Through Private Ordering 
 
To the extent that, under current law, shareholder agreements 
afford corporate participants greater latitude to engage in private 
ordering than charter and bylaw provisions, the approach advocated by 
this Article restricts private ordering.  This result may be criticized as 
limiting valuable corporate innovation.  Shareholder agreements enable 
early-stage companies the flexibility to adjust corporate law rules to meet 
their needs and do so through a mechanism that is confidential and easily 
created and modified.  More significantly, forcing private ordering into 
the charter and bylaws prevents corporate participants from contracting 
around mandatory provisions of corporate law.   
The debate over the extent to which corporate law should 
incorporate mandatory features as opposed to being subject to complete 
freedom of contract is beyond the scope of this Article.  Assuming, 
however, that some constraints on private ordering are desirable as a 
matter of efficiency or public policy, the question is whether shareholder 
agreements should be able to avoid those constraints.  This Article 
argues that they should not.  If mandatory corporate law rules are 
desirable, either as a matter of public policy or to protect the rights of 
minority shareholders or other stakeholders, those same considerations 
should mitigate against the enforcement of shareholder agreements that 
are inconsistent with those rules.  By the same token, to the extent that 
shareholder agreements are valuable tools for innovative private 
ordering, the flexibility they provide should not be limited to private 
companies that have the option of using shareholder agreements rather 
than the charter or bylaws.  
 
are under no obligation to vote their shares in the best interests of the corporation.” Jill 
E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 47-48 (2017). 
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The solution is to formalize the mechanism by which 
corporations engage in private ordering.  Because corporation statutes 
are broadly enabling, corporations have extensive power to adopt firm-
specific charter and bylaw provisions within the express contours of the 
existing statutory framework.  The power to do so is found both in 
specific statutory provisions such as those that prescribe the tools for 
adopting a classified board, and the general grant of authority to adopt 
firm-specific charter and bylaw provisions.   
Functionally, under this statutory framework, private ordering 
innovation operates as a tripartite process.  In the first instance, corporate 
participants identify a potentially beneficial issue that can potentially be 
addressed through firm-specific private ordering.  To the extent they 
believe that the innovation is permitted under existing law, they can 
implement it through a charter or bylaw.  To the extent that they believe 
existing law does not currently permit the provision, they can seek 
legislation.  If the validity of an innovative charter or bylaw is 
subsequently challenged, courts can evaluate the degree to which the 
provision is in tension with the statute and public policy.  Judicial 
approval of the provision is likely to lead to broader adoption, but even 
then, the provision will be subject to the discipline of market forces, and 
some innovative provisions will not be successful.  Finally, state 
legislatures can evaluate the courts’ analysis and ratify or overturn the 
courts’ conclusions by statute.  
Importantly, as this process reveals, and experience further 
demonstrates, private ordering innovation need not await legislative 
action.  Corporations can and do adopt novel charter and bylaw 
provisions, and courts evaluate the validity of these provisions in the 
absence of clear statutory guidance.   More to the point, innovation in 
private ordering is facilitated if both public and private corporations use 
the same governance mechanisms because the transparency of public 
company charters and bylaws reduces information costs, facilitates 
standardization and provides a vibrant mechanism for evaluating the 
costs and benefits of innovation through the discipline of both 
shareholder oversight and capital market discipline.222  
 
222 See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, How Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 649, 695 (2016) (detailing the power of both Institutional Shareholder 
Services and the Wachtell Lipton law firm in influencing firm behavior with respect to 
the adoption of an innovative corporate governance bylaw).  
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Formal legislative action operates as a safety valve with respect 
to this process. State legislatures can evaluate the policy rationale for 
taking a mandatory versus enabling approach.   From a comparative 
institutional perspective, they are particularly well-suited to engage in 
this analysis.223  Legislatures can readily access the information 
necessary to determine the potential costs and benefits of innovation.224  
Unlike courts, legislatures control their agendas and need not wait for 
litigation to evaluate the validity of a provision.  Finally, legislatures can 
assess the interests of those likely to be affected by an opt-out or waiver, 
interests that may not be represented in the litigation context.  As a 
result, they can identify the private ordering approach most protective of 
those interests.  For example, the legislature might determine that 
corporations should be allowed to limit director liability for breaches of 
the duty of care through private ordering, but that the risk that directors 
will act out of self-interest if permitted to adopt such limitations 
unilaterally means that they should be limited to charter provisions that 
require shareholder approval. 
The history of private ordering innovation in corporate law is 
replete with illustrations of this process at work.  Corporations adopted 
innovative charter and bylaw forum selection provisions in response to 
the explosion in multi-forum litigation challenging mergers.  The validity 
of these provisions was uncertain until the Delaware court’s 
Boilermakers decision, after which their adoption increased 
dramatically.225  The Delaware legislature subsequently endorsed forum 
selection provisions and provided clarification as to their permissible 
scope.226 
 
223 See generally Neil K. Komesar, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). (developing analysis of 
comparative institutional advantage). 
224 Roberta Romano explains, for example, the variety of legislative responses in the 
late 1980s, to the crisis in the market for D&O insurance as “an excellent case study of 
the successful operation of federalism as a laboratory for legal reform.”  Roberta 
Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 221 (2006).  See also Edward P. Welch 
& Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and its Limits in the Delaware Corporation Law, 33 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 854 (2008) (describing Delaware legislature’s adoption of 
§102(b)(7) in response to the D&O insurance crisis). 
225 See Romano & Sanga, supra note 212 (documenting the spread of forum selection 
provisions after the Boilermakers decision). 
226 See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1669-71 (describing legislation authorizing forum 
selection charter and bylaw provisions). 
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The corporate opportunity doctrine is a component of the 
common law duty of loyalty.227  Courts adopted various tests to 
determine when the doctrine had been breached, and the variety and 
complexity of the tests led the doctrine to become “unpredictable and 
over complicated.”228  To reduce possible corporate opportunity doctrine 
litigation, Tri-Star Pictures amended its charter to limit the liability of its 
directors for potential breaches.  The court in Siegman v. Tri-Star 
Pictures held that, because the charter provision could limit liability for a 
breach of the duty of loyalty, it was potentially invalid.229  The Delaware 
legislature responded by adopting 8 Del. §122(17), which authorizes 
corporations to adopt corporate opportunity doctrine waivers in their 
charters.  The legislation responded to a broad-based market demand 
and, subsequent to its enactment, corporations broadly adopted such 
waivers.230  Many states followed Delaware’s lead and adopted similar 
legislation.231  Moreover, at least one empirical study has found market 
reactions to the adoption of such waivers to be favorable.232 
Finally, as institutional investors became more active in corporate 
governance, they sought ways to overcome collective action problems 
and increase shareholder access to the corporate proxy machinery.  One 
of the tools for doing so was proxy reimbursement bylaws – bylaws that 
entitled shareholders to reimbursement of their expenses in conducting a 
 
227 Eric Talley & Mira Hashmall, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, USC Gould 
Sch. L. (Feb. 2001), https://weblaw.usc.edu/why/academics/cle/icc/assets/docs/ 
articles/iccfinal.pdf. 
228 Martha M. Effinger, Comment: A New Corporate Statute: Adding Explicit 
Procedures to Maryland’s Corporate Opportunity Waiver Provision, 48 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 293, 300 (2019). 
229 Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, *26 (“Thus, at least one 
scenario (and perhaps others) could plausibly be constructed where Article Sixth would 
eliminate or limit the liability of Tri-Star directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of 
loyalty - - a result proscribed by § 102(b)(7)”). 
230 See Talley & Rauterberg, supra note 79 at 1079 (stating that “hundreds of public 
corporations in our sample – and well over one thousand in the population – have 
disclosed or executed waivers”).  
231 See Effinger, supra note 228 at 305 (“many states have followed by adopting 
corporate opportunity waivers”).  Notably, not every state’s approach is identical to 
Delaware’s.  For example, Georgia allows corporate opportunity doctrine waivers in 
both the charter and the bylaws.  See Georgia § 14-2-870. 
232 Talley & Rauterberg, supra note 79 at 1081 (reporting results of an event study 
finding that “market reactions [to the adoption of a waiver] appear to be favorable, 
resulting in an average positive abnormal stock return hovering around one percent in 
the days immediately surrounding the announcement date”). 
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proxy contest if the context was successful.  In CA v. AFSCME, the 
Delaware Supreme Court struck down a proxy reimbursement bylaw on 
the basis that it interfered with the board’s statutory authority to 
determine how corporate money should be spent.233  The legislature 
overturned the decision, adopting a statutory provision that explicitly 
authorized proxy reimbursement bylaws.234 
These examples suggest that requiring corporations to use their 
charters and bylaws to implement private ordering will not stifle 
innovation.  To the contrary, the use of formal governance tools 
facilitates the transparency of governance innovation, leads to 
clarification of the law and permits the spread of provisions that have the 
potential to enhance corporate value or facilitate their operations.  
Channeling innovation through charter and bylaw provisions, provisions 
that can be adopted by public companies and whose validity can be 
clarified through litigation and legislation has led to their widespread 
use.  At the same time, waivers and innovations that have been 
implemented through shareholder agreements – such as appraisal 
waivers and limits on shareholder inspection rights – have not been 




This Article has explored the role of shareholder agreements as 
substitutes for the corporate charter and bylaws in adopting firm-specific 
private ordering.  It has situated shareholder agreements on the boundary 
between the contract law and corporate law paradigms and argued that 
their use highlights the limitations of viewing the two paradigms as 
analogous.  Structuring corporations by contract differs from the quasi-
contractual tailoring available through the corporate charter and bylaws, 
and the use of shareholder agreements to do so sacrifices important 
components of corporate law and structure.   
These issues are of concern as the number and size of private 
companies continue to grow.  Because private companies are not subject 
to federally-mandated disclosure requirements or capital market 
discipline, they are particularly vulnerable to poor corporate governance 
 
233 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239–40 (Del. 2008). 
234 8 De. 8, § 113.  See Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay 
Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 763 (2013) (describing 
legislation authorizing both proxy reimbursement and proxy access bylaws). 
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practices that reduce the accountability of officers, directors and 
controlling shareholders and potentially sacrifice the interests of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  The opacity and uncertainty 
associated with shareholder agreements and the risk that they will be 
used as tools to depart from the standardization associated with the 
corporate form increase this potential.  
This analysis indicates that courts may be overly willing to rely 
on principles of freedom of contract to uphold and enforce shareholder 
agreements.  That approach is misguided.  Instead, this Article argues 
that shareholder agreements should be disfavored as tools of private 
ordering, and courts should limit their enforcement to circumstances in 
which the agreement deals exclusively with a shareholder’s individual 
interests.  Although the Article applauds corporate participants’ 
continued efforts to use private ordering to innovate, such innovation 
should rely on the corporate law instruments – the charter and bylaws – 
rather than private contract. 
 
